



## The Dynamics of Transnational Religious Movements on the Resilience of the Pancasila Ideology

Sholehoddin<sup>1</sup>, Mohammad Azka Al Azkiya<sup>2</sup>, Ilhamda Fattah Kaloko<sup>3\*</sup>, Aisyah Chairil<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup> Islamic University of Madinah, Medina, Saudi Arabia

<sup>3</sup> Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji, Tanjung Pinang, Indonesia

<sup>4</sup> Universitas Mohammad Natsir, Bukittinggi, Indonesia

\*Author's correspondence email: [ilhamdafattahkaloko@umrah.ac.id](mailto:ilhamdafattahkaloko@umrah.ac.id)

### ARTICLE INFO

#### Keywords:

Ideological resilience, Public scrutiny, Religious movements, Symbolic arena, Transnational ideology

#### DOI:

10.65586/jpr.v1i3.33

#### Article History:

Submitted: 10-07-2025

Revised: 02-09-2025

Accepted: 15-10-2025

Published online: 15-12-2025

#### Published by:

Mahkota Science Publishers

### ABSTRACT

Amid the tide of religious transnationalism that makes faith a cross-border political identity, the resilience of the Pancasila ideology is tested not only by overt threats but primarily by the nation's capacity to maintain national consensus. This study uses a mixed-methods approach with a convergent-integrative design that simultaneously combines non-interactive qualitative and quantitative analysis, recognising that the dynamics of transnational religious movements and the resilience of the Pancasila ideology are ideological, discursive, and structural phenomena that require in-depth analysis and empirical measurement. The results confirm that the dynamics of transnational religious movements interact with the resilience of the Pancasila ideology through three interlocking channels, namely an algorithm-based digital *da'wah* ecosystem that normalises radicalisation and shifts civic loyalty towards a political *ummah*, cross-border funding infrastructure that converts philanthropy into an instrument for regulating the social agenda as well as substituting the function of the state, and institutional strategies that engineer official norms through education, local regulations, bureaucracy, social certification, and soft law mechanisms that often escape public scrutiny. This synthesis refines the findings of previous studies that usually stop at violent extremism by showing that the erosion of national consensus more often occurs through discursive normalisation, service dependency, and standardisation of piety that appears pious but gradually shifts constitutional legitimacy.

## **A. Introduction**

In recent years, Indonesia has faced several events that demonstrate how transnational ideologies, whether based on religion or other extreme identities, can intersect with issues of security, social cohesion and ideological stability (Arifin et al., 2025). The latest regional security reports place Indonesia as one of the countries that still faces risks from extremist networks that exploit global religious symbols and narratives, even though the country's capacity for terrorism prevention and countermeasures has relatively improved compared to a decade ago.

Violent incidents linked to ideological motives, including attacks on places of worship and state symbols in Southeast Asia, serve as a reminder that ideological radicalisation has not been completely eradicated and can emerge in forms that are adaptable to the local context (Shah et al., 2022; Wahyono et al., 2024). In situations such as this, Pancasila, as the state ideology, not only serves as a constitutional normative basis but also as an ideological instrument that must be resilient in the face of transnational ideological penetration and contestation (Gunawan & Ratmono, 2018).

The concept of Pancasila ideological resilience itself has begun to receive more serious attention from academics and policymakers in recent years (Hidayah, 2024). Efforts to measure and strengthen ideological resilience have been realised, among others, through the development of the Pancasila Ideological Resilience Index, which aims to map the level of internalisation, understanding, and practice of Pancasila values in various levels of society and institutions (Karimullah, 2023). At the same time, the state has formulated various strategic policies, such as strengthening religious moderation and fostering Pancasila ideology through the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency, which emphasises that ideological resilience is a multidimensional process involving cognitive, affective, and structural aspects.

Several recent studies show that research on transnational religious movements in Indonesia has developed significantly, especially in the context of transnational Islam (Hidayah et al., 2024; Suharto, 2018; Wajdi, 2020). Several studies highlight how the ideologies and networks of movements such as Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir, and groups inspired by the global jihad movement interact with the Indonesian socio-political context (Hassan et al., 2025; Rijal, 2022). Recent studies reveal that after the banning of specific organisations, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, their ideologies and networks did not immediately disappear but rather transformed through informal channels, da'wah communities, and digital media, thereby maintaining their transnational dimension even without an official organisational structure. These findings confirm that a legal-formal approach alone is insufficient to understand or respond to the dynamics of transnational religious movements, as ideologies are adaptive and can adjust to state regulatory pressures.

Other studies focusing on religious practices and discourse production on social media show that transnational religious actors utilise the algorithmic logic of digital platforms to build new religious authority, spread religious interpretations that tend to be textualist, and frame socio-political issues in global moral narratives that are often dichotomous between truth and error (Andok, 2024; Bhatia, 2021; Tsuria & Yadlin-Segal, 2021). In this context, the boundaries between religious preaching, ideological activism, and political mobilisation are becoming increasingly blurred, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate expressions of diversity and transnational ideological agendas that could erode national values (Dawson, 2016; Karimov et al., 2024; Mohiuddin, 2023). These studies make an essential contribution to understanding the micro-mechanisms of transnational ideology dissemination. Still, they rarely explicitly link this to the Pancasila ideology framework as a system of values and national consensus.

On the other hand, studies on Pancasila and Indonesian national ideology tend to develop in the disciplines of political science, law, and civic education, with an emphasis on the history, philosophy, and normative implementation of Pancasila in public policy

(Adhayanto et al., 2021; Mukaromah et al., 2022; Pratiwi et al., 2025; Yuwono et al., 2025). These studies generally assert that Pancasila has an open ideological character that can adapt to changing times while also serving as a unifying force for diversity in a pluralistic society. However, this ideological openness also carries vulnerabilities when confronted with transnational ideologies that offer alternative identities grounded in religion or an exclusive global civilisation. Although several researchers have addressed the threat of radicalism and intolerance towards Pancasila, the discussion is often normative. It lacks empirical analysis of how transnational religious movements concretely shape citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and practices (Karimullah, 2022).

These limitations indicate a significant gap in research. First, there is still a lack of research that integrally links the dynamics of transnational religious movements, whether in the form of organisations, ideological networks, or digital practices, with the concept of operational, measurable Pancasila ideological resilience. Second, many previous studies have focused on aspects of security threats or violent radicalism. At the same time, the influence of non-violent transnational ideologies that operate culturally, symbolically, and discursively in shaping the internalisation of Pancasila values has not received adequate attention. Third, there have not been many studies that utilise an interdisciplinary approach to bridge religious studies, political science, and digital communication studies in analysing the complex relationship between transnational religion and state ideology. This knowledge gap has led in a partial, potentially misleading understanding of how to formulate strategies to strengthen the resilience of Pancasila ideology in the global and digital era.

Based on these gaps, this study offers an important new element, which lies in the effort to construct an integrative analytical framework that combines the concept of Pancasila ideological resilience with empirical analysis of the patterns, strategies, and discourse of transnational religious movements in Indonesia. At the theoretical level, this study seeks to broaden the understanding of ideological resilience by interpreting it not only as resistance to threats, but also as the adaptive capacity of society and the state in managing ideological plurality without losing the basic national consensus.

At the conceptual level, this study offers a mapping of the dimensions of Pancasila ideological resilience, which includes cognitive, affective, and practical aspects. It links them to the mechanisms of transnational ideological influence that operate through education, digital media, and religious social networks. Thus, this study focuses on a deep understanding of how transnational religious movements operate, adapt, and interact with the socio-political context of Indonesia, as well as how these dynamics affect the resilience of Pancasila ideology at the individual, community, and institutional levels. The scope of the study includes an analysis of the actors, discourse, and media of official religious movements relevant to the contemporary Indonesian context, without limiting itself to a particular religion or organisation, with a special focus on movements with broad reach and significant ideological influence.

## **B. Method**

This study uses a mixed-methods approach with a convergent-integrative design that simultaneously combines non-interactive qualitative and quantitative analysis, recognising that the dynamics of transnational religious movements and the resilience of the Pancasila ideology are ideological, discursive, and structural phenomena that require in-depth analysis and empirical measurement. The study focuses on two primary constructs, namely the dynamics of transnational religious movements, which are operationalised through indicators of the intensity of exposure to transnational religious discourse, patterns of consumption of transnational digital religious content, and connectivity with global ideological networks, and the resilience of the Pancasila ideology, which is operationally defined as the level of

understanding, acceptance, commitment, and actualisation of Pancasila values in civic attitudes and practices.

The study population comprises Indonesian citizens who are active users of digital religious media, and the quantitative sample was selected through stratified random sampling to ensure socio-demographic representativeness. At the same time, qualitative subjects were purposively selected based on their relevance and the intensity of their exposure to transnational religious content. The research instruments included a Likert scale questionnaire developed from a synthesis of the latest literature on ideological resilience and religious transnationalism, as well as document analysis and digital ethnography protocols to examine content, narratives, and patterns of ideological interaction in online spaces. At the same time, the validity of qualitative data was ensured through source triangulation, persistent observation, and audit trails.

Data collection was carried out in stages, beginning with mapping and collecting document-based digital data and online traces, followed by a nationwide quantitative survey, and then integrating the findings at the analysis stage. Qualitative data analysis was conducted through thematic analysis and critical discourse to reveal ideological patterns and value articulation strategies (Lawless & Chen, 2019; Ziskin, 2019). At the same time, quantitative data is analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics, including regression or structural modelling, to test the relationship and strength of the influence of transnational religious movement dynamics on the resilience of the Pancasila ideology, so that the overall analysis design is in line with the objectives of the study, which requires both interpretative depth and empirical rigour.

### **C. Results and Discussion**

#### **1. Transnational Da'wah Ecosystem Based on Digital Platform Algorithms as a Machine for Shifting Ideological Loyalty**

The transnational da'wah ecosystem based on digital platform algorithms can be understood as a space for the circulation of religious discourse shaped by interactions between content providers, platform business logic, and user behaviour, so that religion is no longer present solely as a doctrine, but as an architecture of experience that is curated, personalised, and optimised for attention (Karimullah, Rahman, et al., 2023). From the perspective of platformisation and the attention economy, digital platforms are not merely neutral mediums but social infrastructures that structure the visibility, accessibility, and credibility of messages through recommendation mechanisms, ratings, and engagement metrics. When transnational da'wah enters this infrastructure, messages that carry global identities, such as the idea of a cross-border community of faith, politically imagined ummah solidarity, or models of ideal order that claim universality, gain a new channel far more efficient than conventional dissemination models (Karimullah, Said, et al., 2023).

The implication is that individual ideological loyalty is not only shaped by formal institutions such as schools, local religious organisations, or the state, but also by repetitive experiences in digital spaces that subtly shift the normative frame of reference from citizenship and constitutional frameworks towards transnational religious frameworks that are perceived as more pure and authentic. This shift is gradual because algorithms tend to accelerate content that triggers emotion, identification, and engagement. At the same time, users are psychologically driven to seek identity coherence, moral certainty, and a sense of belonging in communities that offer simple answers to social complexities.

At the mechanism level, content recommendations function as a curation engine that produces religious information bubbles through the reinforcement of preferences, reduced exposure to alternative perspectives, and the normalisation of specific interpretations as standards of piety. The logic of recommendation systems generally prioritises the likelihood

that users will stay longer, react more strongly, or return, so that content that evokes affective resonance is more likely to be promoted.

When religious content is produced in a style that suits the dynamics of the platform, such as short pieces that stimulate emotions, provocative headlines, and us-versus-them narratives, algorithms tend to place it in the broader distribution path. At this point, religious discourse is not only disseminated but also orchestrated by an architecture of choices that users are unaware of, so that the spiritual experience is transformed into a series of exposures that appear personal and organic, when in fact they are shaped by probabilistic calculations (Adeoye & Noorhayati, 2024). Religious information bubbles then function as a cognitive environment that reinforces prejudices, narrows the definition of truth, and creates the impression that certain views are held by the majority, when in fact they are the result of the microaggregation of similar content constantly repeated.

Trending features and recommendation pages that highlight what is currently popular reinforce this effect through social proof and popularity heuristics. When specific topics, such as public moral issues, policy controversies, or easily politicised social issues, trend, users receive signals that the problem has collective urgency, thus encouraging them to engage without adequate verification. Within the framework of framing theory, trending is not just a list of topics but a tool for setting the agenda that directs attention to a particular frame while submerging alternative frames.

Transnational da'wah capitalises on the momentum of trends by linking viral moral issues to grand narratives about civilisational crises, the decline of the ummah, or the state's failure to uphold truth, thereby drawing users' daily moral experiences into a transnational political imagination. (Al Hamid et al., 2025) As a result, dissatisfaction that was previously specific and local can be elevated to ideological disappointment with the national consensus, because the platform provides a fast track from spontaneous emotion to comprehensive normative justification. At this stage, the normalisation of anti-state narratives does not always appear in the form of frontal appeals, but rather through the repetition of insinuations that the state is negligent, pseudo-neutral, or even hostile to religion.

The existence of closed groups and private channels deepens gradual radicalisation through the dynamics of epistemic communities that are relatively immune to social correction. Sociologically, closed spaces create conditions for more intimate, intense, and homogeneous communication, thereby lowering the social cost of expressing extreme views while increasing the pressure to conform. In such groups, authority no longer depends on institutional legitimacy, but rather on the intensity of participation, emotional closeness, and the performativity of piety recognised by the community.

Material that was previously presented lightly in the public sphere can be elevated to more ideological discussion in private spaces, often framed as exceptional knowledge for those who are ready or want to be steadfast, so that the process of ideological learning appears as spiritual deepening. At this point, internal social control within the community serves as a disciplinary mechanism: doubt is seen as a weakness of faith, criticism as slander, and submission to group authority as a logical consequence of *hijrah*. This process is in line with the theory of radicalisation as a gradual change in identity, social relations, and the framework of legitimacy, in which individuals increasingly rely on closed communities as a source of truth.

The role of micro-influencers is crucial because they serve as a link between transnational ideological discourse and local audiences seeking practical guidance (Ahad, 2021). Unlike formal authorities, who are often perceived as distant, micro-influencers are more approachable, with familiar lifestyles, everyday language, and personal narratives that facilitate identification. In the study of the mediatisation of religion, religious authority has shifted from institutions to figures who can master media logic, package messages, and maintain audience engagement. Micro-influencers utilise the aesthetics of digital piety to build

emotional credibility. This credibility is then used as capital to gradually insert political frames, as the audience has already built trust in these figures as role models.

Targeted advertising and microtargeting practices complicate the issue by enabling audience segmentation based on interests, tendencies, and psychological vulnerabilities, allowing messages to be tailored to maximise resonance. From a political communication perspective, microtargeting transforms preaching into personalised campaigns: individuals who frequently interact with moral content will receive more material about moral crises and normative solutions; individuals who are anxious about the economy may receive narratives about systemic injustice; individuals involved in identity conflicts may be given definitive answers about who we are and who our opponents are (Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2018; Papathanassopoulos & Giannouli, 2025).

This personalisation accelerates the formation of information bubbles because users not only choose content, but are also selected for content that reinforces specific emotional and cognitive trajectories. At this stage, anti-state narratives are normalised through the repetition of consistent yet varied messages, making them appear as natural conclusions individuals have arrived at themselves rather than as external influences. The effect is stronger internalisation because it aligns with the illusion of autonomous choice, even though the exposure path has been systematically curated.

The gradual radicalisation process in this ecosystem often begins with light content on the theme of motivational migration, focusing on self-improvement, lifestyle changes, and the search for meaning. Psychologically, this phase takes advantage of moments of cognitive opening, when individuals feel that their old lives are unsatisfactory and seek a new, more stable identity. The *hijrah* narrative emphasises the moral contrast between the past and the present, creating a dichotomy that facilitates social simplification (Rijal, 2025). Once this dichotomy is ingrained, subsequent content can lead users to broader normative conclusions: that piety is not enough at the personal level but must be realised in the social order. This is where political fiqh material comes in as a bridge that shifts attention from individual ethics to collective governance, often by highlighting the concepts of obedience, leadership, and the obligation to uphold rules that are considered divine. This transition appears natural because it is presented as a logical continuation of the commitment to *hijrah*, when in fact, ideologically, it is a shift in framework from personal morality to a political project of identity.

The delegitimisation of Pancasila as an artificial ideology usually occurs after the political fiqh framework has been strengthened, because by then users have accepted the premise that the highest legitimacy comes from a transcendent source and that human rules are always prone to deviation. An effective discursive strategy is not to reject Pancasila outright from the outset, but to sow doubt through rhetorical questions, normative comparisons, and moral insinuations. Pancasila can be framed as an incomplete historical compromise, a neutral symbol that offers no detailed moral guidance, or a product of the elite that has yielded to plurality (Kim, 2024).

In ideological studies, this kind of delegitimisation works by shifting the source of legitimacy from a social contract to a claim of absolute truth, so that the concept of citizenship based on equality appears inferior to religious identity, which is considered more important (Doyle, 2019; Sprinzak, 2014). At this stage, anti-state sentiment does not always mean rejection of the state as an entity, but rather rejection of the state's ideological foundations and of democratic mechanisms perceived as relativistic, thereby opening space for transnational political agendas that offer alternative models.

The change in framing from the concept of citizenship to the idea of political ummah is at the heart of the shift in ideological loyalty. Citizenship demands horizontal relations between citizens within an agreed legal framework. At the same time, the political ummah, in its politicised form, emphasises solidarity based on religious identity that transcends national boundaries and can place religious loyalty above constitutional loyalty. Within this

framework, social relations are interpreted not through the category of equal citizens, but through moral categories: who is in line with religion and who is opposed to it.

Social identity theory explains that when group identity becomes dominant, individuals tend to evaluate information based on its conformity with group norms, rather than on evidence (Lizzio-Wilson et al., 2022). Digital platforms accelerate the dominance of this identity by providing continuous community cues, such as symbols, jargon, hashtags, and participation rituals. When the identity of the political ummah has strengthened, Pancasila can be described as a secondary identity or even an obstacle. At the same time, the concept of nationalism is reduced to chauvinism or asabiyah in specific interpretations.

This is where algorithmic engines function not only as content deliverers, but also as identity reinforcers that produce alternative ideological loyalties. In the context of Pancasila resilience, the most decisive problem lies in the realm of soft radicalisation, which appears pious and apolitical on the surface, but slowly produces a subtle rejection of the national consensus. Many studies still focus on violent extremism because its indicators are easier to recognise, such as involvement in terrorist networks, explicit hate speech, or incitement to violence (Ayu et al., 2025). In fact, changes in public attitudes often occur long before that phase, when individuals begin to view the state as morally illegitimate, consider democracy a haram system, or regard pluralism as a threat to their faith. Soft radicalisation works through normalisation, which is the process of making specific ideas feel ordinary, reasonable, or even noble, without the need for extreme actions.

The resilience of the Pancasila ideology is not only about withstanding violent attacks but also about maintaining the legitimacy of its fundamental values in the public sphere, which is now partly controlled by algorithms and the attention economy (Karimullah et al., 2025). Failure to recognise soft radicalisation means being late in understanding the social transformations that have influenced political preferences, inter-community relations, and the way the younger generation interprets nationality (Hayatullah et al., 2025; Wiranti et al., 2025). The controversial impact of this ecosystem is substantial because it touches on the battle over definitions of who has the right to be called religious, nationalist, or infidel in social practice.

In the digital space, labels are not only theological categories but also instruments of social exclusion that affect reputation, friendship networks, and opportunities for participation. When religiosity is monopolised by a single style of interpretation and a specific performance of piety, moderate religiosity or inclusive nationalism can be stigmatised as compromising, hypocritical, or even anti-religious. Community polarisation occurs not only at the level of opinion, but also at the level of affection and identity. In political psychology, this kind of affective polarisation is more dangerous than ordinary differences of opinion because it cuts off the possibility of dialogue and strengthens support for discriminatory actions. Digital platforms exacerbate polarisation because content that provokes anger or moral superiority tends to go viral, while content that demands nuance and reflection is less competitive in the attention economy (Nurizka, Islami, et al., 2025).

The influence on young voters' political choices can occur through an indirect but systematic process. When political ummah identity becomes the primary lens, political preferences are no longer determined primarily by policy programmes, but by moral judgements and identities regarding candidates, parties, or policies deemed pro-religion or anti-religion. Transnational da'wah, which is strengthening in the religious information bubble, can shift political rationality to identitarian loyalty, thereby transforming democracy from an arena of deliberation to an arena of identity affirmation (Karimullah, 2024).

Young voters who are intensely engaged in the digital space are vulnerable to this logic because their political experiences are primarily mediated by platforms, rather than by formal political organisations or mature civic literacy (Nurizka, Jamil, et al., 2025; Rembulan et al., 2025). At the same time, micro-influencers can connect daily moral narratives with electoral choices through implicit recommendations, identity signals, or issue framing, without running

explicit campaigns. Under such conditions, the shift in ideological loyalty towards Pancasila does not always manifest as a formal rejection, but rather as a decline in emotional affiliation with national symbols and an increase in acceptance of alternative political projects perceived as more in line with one's faith.

Theoretically, the algorithm-based transnational da'wah ecosystem requires an interpretation that goes beyond a security-only approach towards one grounded in an information ecology and ideological resilience. The resilience of Pancasila needs to be understood as the ability of society and institutions to maintain a framework of equal citizenship, recognised diversity, and constitutional legitimacy as a common agreement, amid a flood of content that fragments the public sphere. This requires an analysis that combines framing theory, social identity theory, digital communication studies, and transnational movement theory to explain how messages move, why messages are believed, and when messages become ideological commitments. In this framework, algorithms are not the sole actors, but catalysts that accelerate the interconnection between individual psychological needs, the economic incentives of content creators, and transnational ideological agendas.

The main issue is not merely the existence of extreme content, but the curation structures and communities that make certain content repetitive, reinforce it, and normalise it. Religious information bubbles produce epistemic conditions in which constitutional arguments are defeated by simplified moral claims, and national dialogue is defeated by reinforced group identities. Because soft radicalisation is often framed as a deepening of faith, interventions that merely combat radicalism can be counterproductive if they are not sensitive to the dynamics of identity and the spiritual needs of the audience. Conversely, strengthening Pancasila resilience in the algorithmic era requires a detailed understanding of content exposure trajectories, changes in moral vocabulary, and mechanisms of authority formation in the digital space, so that policy, education, and literacy responses can be directed to the critical points that truly matter.

## **2. Transnational Funding Infrastructure Philanthropy, Cryptocurrency, Sharia Fintech as Levers of Social Policy Influence**

Conceptually, the relationship between funding and social policy influence can be explained through several mutually reinforcing frameworks. Resource mobilisation theory asserts that social movements do not survive solely on ideas, but also on their ability to continuously gather and allocate material, organisational, and symbolic resources. Meanwhile, the transnational advocacy networks approach shows how cross-border actors build networks that link donors, intermediaries, local organisations, and public figures to promote specific agendas through information, symbols, and material support.

Within the framework of hegemony, funding acts as a 'consensus technology' that creates acceptance of certain narratives not through coercion, but through habituation and the provision of benefits that bind feelings of gratitude, security, and indebtedness. However, this influence is often not declared as political intervention; it appears as the morality of aid, as if it were neutral and universal, when in fact it shapes configurations of interests and social policy orientations. Therefore, the provocative issue is not the practice of charity itself, but how funds lock in agendas, shift the state's function, and reorganise citizenship relations through the substitution of social services, thereby impacting the resilience of national ideology.

Cross-border resource flows generally enter through seemingly benign channels: disaster donations, health assistance, food programmes, educational scholarships, the development of places of worship and community facilities, and the strengthening of the micro-economy through social businesses. In the early stages, these resources often fill service gaps that are not fully covered by the state, especially in vulnerable areas, marginalised communities, or sectors that are not yet a priority for public budgets. This is where the logic

of structural dependence arises: communities begin to adjust the rhythm of their activities, organisational structures, and programme orientations to funding cycles, reporting requirements, and donor preferences.

In dependency and path dependence theory, dependency is not merely an inability to be self-sufficient; it arises when current institutional choices are locked in by past incentives, making it difficult for communities to break out of specific patterns of assistance without incurring high social costs. When community social, educational, or economic programmes become increasingly dependent on transnational resources, the space for autonomy in determining the local agenda can narrow, and community priorities can become distorted to follow themes that are most easily funded, most promising in terms of visibility, or most aligned with a particular value framework.

Digital transformation reinforces these dynamics by expanding modern payment channels that facilitate rapid, segmented, and recurring fund collection and distribution. Sharia fintech, online donation platforms, digital wallets, QR-based payments, and one-click donation integration increase the opportunities for micro-donations and stable donation subscriptions, enabling implementing organisations to build more predictable cash flows while expanding their donor base across countries. On the other hand, the use of crypto assets as a medium of transfer or store of value offers unique characteristics.

Consequently, funding infrastructure is no longer merely a matter for charitable institutions, but also a matter of financial rails that mediate social and political relations. At the governance level, this change poses challenges of regulation and accountability, including anti-money laundering compliance and the prevention of illicit funding. Still, at the sociological level, it produces a new form of solidarity organisation: donations become a practice of identity that can be displayed, celebrated, and used as a measure of piety or moral commitment, thereby expanding the bond between givers, intermediaries, and recipients.

Community dependence is not formed solely by the flow of funds, but by these funds operating as capacity builders that replace or rival the state's role in social services (Marques & Bichir, 2024). When specific charities or social businesses provide low-cost clinics, ongoing scholarships, regular food aid, alternative schools, or accessible microfinance, communities perceive the state as present through other parties that are closer, more responsive, and more consistent. In the literature on welfare pluralism, this condition marks the hybridisation of welfare service providers: the state is not the only actor, but one of many providers competing in the arena of legitimacy.

Problems arise when the substitution of state functions is accompanied by the production of identities and moralities that shift the basis of civic solidarity to a more exclusive group solidarity (Burelli & Camboni, 2023; Tava, 2023). Social assistance, which should strengthen citizen inclusion, can turn into a boundary-making mechanism, namely the process of drawing social boundaries between those who are in line with specific values or networks and those who are not. In a subtlwayrm, beneficiaries are encouraged to adjust their behaviour to group norms in a more assertive manner; access to benefits can be perceived as dependent on a willingness to participate in certain activities, attend studies, or affirm the network's symbols.

Within the framework of Pancasila ideological resilience, this issue of transnational funding is crucial because it touches on the practical dimension of values, namely, how citizens experience the state in the form of social services and how that experience shapes their trust, affiliation, and sense of belonging to the Indonesian political community. Pancasila, as a national ideologue, requires a foundation of fair, inclusive, and reliable citizenship experiences (Prakoso et al., 2024; Sudirta et al., 2025). When this basis weakens, the space for the substitution of authority by non-state networks strengthens. Therefore, discussing transnational philanthropy is not sufficient if it only assesses the formal legality of fund flows or calculates aid output. Instead, it is necessary to determine the ideological implications of

substituting for state functions, especially when aid is accompanied by a moral curriculum that breeds suspicion of pluralism and delegitimises national symbols. The challenge is both normative and empirical: to maintain philanthropy's openness as part of global solidarity while ensuring its practices do not lock in an agenda that negates the national social contract.

This complexity requires a research approach that is capable of tracing resource flows, power relations, and transformations of meaning simultaneously. Participatory social audits are relevant because they allow beneficiary communities to participate in mapping programmes, funding sources, forms of accountability, and social consequences, thereby ensuring research does not rely on external assumptions that ignore citizens' experiences. Through participatory audits, it can be identified whether recipients feel symbolic pressure, whether the beneficiary selection mechanism is inclusive, and how the programme affects citizens' relations with state institutions. Aggregate transaction analysis based on public data is also relevant for mapping funding flow patterns without breaching individual privacy, such as institutional financial reports, donation disclosure data, foundation registration records, crowdfunding campaign information, and transaction traces that can be studied at the aggregate level from modern payment channels.

For crypto assets, analysis should focus on general trends and patterns rather than technical exploitation, emphasising the principles of prudence and regulatory compliance (Wronka, 2024). Case studies of community programme financing can deepen understanding of how funds are translated into practice, including how curricula, symbols, and narratives are embedded in social service activities (Shabazz & Cooks, 2022; Shier & Van-Du, 2018). Interviews with fundraisers, when used, need to be conducted ethically and reflectively to capture actors' rationality, narrative strategies, and internal accountability logic. However, if research design limitations preclude interviews, similar information can be traced through document analysis, campaign recordings, promotional content, and digital observation of fundraising interactions on platforms.

Mapping the money value chain also requires conceptualisation that distinguishes the role of each node in the network so that the analysis does not generalise philanthropy as a threat or, conversely, absolutise philanthropy as a good without side effects. Foreign donors can be diverse: diaspora individuals, humanitarian foundations, educational institutions, social business networks, or online collectives formed from global moral sentiment. Local intermediaries can be legal organisations, informal communities, missionary institutions, or digital aggregators that connect campaigns with payment channels. Implementing agencies operate at the programme level, with operational structures that foster certain habits and disciplines among beneficiaries. Fundraising influencers not only collect funds, but also shape the architecture of public emotion through stories, symbols, and dramatisations of needs, thereby determining which issues are worthy of funding and which are not. Beneficiaries are not passive parties; they interpret, negotiate, and sometimes reject the meaning of aid, but their bargaining position is influenced by their level of material dependence and social integration with networks.

### **3. The War of Interpretation of Pancasila Through Infiltration of Education, Local Regulations, Bureaucracy, and Social Certification That Changes Public Norms**

The war over the interpretation of Pancasila in the contemporary era no longer operates primarily as an abstract debate about the philosophical foundations of the state, but rather as an increasingly institutionalised contestation over the definition of public norms and moral authority with the right to regulate citizens' lives. From an ideological theory perspective, Pancasila can be understood as a floating signifier whose meaning is constantly contested through discursive and institutional practices, so that the contestation of interpretation is never resolved at the rhetorical level, but moves into the arena of policy-

making, curriculum development, civil service training, and regulatory instruments that shape social routines (Hakim, 2023b, 2023a).

Transnational religious movements, as actors with cross-border networks of ideas, symbolic resources, and often access to global knowledge architecture, utilise these institutional spaces to shift the centre of gravity of the debate from what Pancasila is to how Pancasila is implemented, with a tendency to instil specific moral definitions as the most valid interpretation, when the interpretation of Pancasila is selectively aligned with the ethical agenda of a particular group, Pancasila risks being reduced from a pluralistic and inclusive national consensus to a device of legitimisation for the normalisation of social control practices that emphasise identity conformity rather than citizenship equality.

This change in the contestation field has become increasingly significant in the context of post-reform Indonesian governance, when decentralisation has expanded the space for local policy, increased the number of decision-making actors, and opened up opportunities for the diffusion of norms from below. Within the framework of policy diffusion, norms can spread through inter-regional competition, the imitation of popular policies, and advocacy networks that connect local actors with transnational centres of ideas. It is at this point that the institutional strategies of transnational religious movements can be read as attempts to engineer official norms through methods that are not always confrontational, but rather utilise administrative mechanisms that appear routine and procedural.

If the approach that is prominent in the public sphere is preaching and persuasion, then in the institutional sphere, the dominant approach is standardisation, certification, training, and codification (Keane, 2018; Whyte, 2022). The effect is not immediately apparent as a rejection of Pancasila, but rather as a change in the definition of propriety, fairness, and moral obligations in the provision of public services, education, and social life. At a particular stage, these changes create a regime of compliance built not primarily on formal legal sanctions, but on shame, fear of being labelled deviant, and concern about losing social access.

Infiltration into the realm of education is one of the most strategic avenues because schools are social reproduction machines that shape the knowledge, habitus, and civic imagination of the younger generation (McFadden, 2025). Curriculum politics is not only about explicit material but also about the hidden curriculum in including teaching styles, teacher authority, social norms, and symbols given sacred status (Ernest, 2024). Transnational religious movements can influence the curriculum through the development of modules, teacher training, the provision of teaching materials, or cooperation in extracurricular activities, thereby shaping the standard interpretation of national issues (Marshall, 2018; Werner, 2024). This is where the war over the interpretation of Pancasila takes a subtle form: not saying that Pancasila is wrong, but shifting the centre of legitimacy from the constitution and citizenship to a set of moral norms positioned as higher and purer.

When students are accustomed to interpreting public identity primarily through the categories of faith and moral purity, the concept of equal citizenship can weaken, as it appears secondary to politicised religious loyalty. Education then becomes an arena for normalising the dichotomy of right versus wrong, which, if not critiqued, can foster a preference for restricting minority groups as something natural in the name of morality.

Another strategy that is often overlooked is the training of officials and the development of the bureaucracy, because the bureaucracy is not only the implementer of policy, but also the producer of administrative norms that determine how the state is present in everyday life. The theory of street-level bureaucracy asserts that frontline officials translate rules into micro-decisions that directly affect citizens, such as in administrative services, permits, social assistance, and conflict mediation. When officials undergo ideological socialisation through training that emphasises a single model of morality as a measure of professionalism, public policy can shift from the principles of neutrality and inclusion towards selective practices that differentiate citizens based on moral suitability.

Training officials can become a vehicle for institutional isomorphism, namely the standardisation of an organisation's way of thinking through standards and procedures that appear technocratic but contain specific values (Mendes Junior & Alves, 2023). In the context of the war of interpretation over Pancasila, this standardisation is dangerous if it leads officials to believe that upholding the morality of the network is part of the state's duty, so that they view diversity as a problem to be controlled, rather than a reality to be managed fairly.

Educational mobility produces lumber communities that bring home knowledge, networks, and symbolic authority from overseas institutions. In many cases, this transfer of knowledge can enrich religious practices and professional capacity (Pertamawati et al., 2025; Wahyudi et al., 2025). Still, in the context of the war over the interpretation of Pancasila, it can serve as a channel for the diffusion of norms that reinforce a single model of morality and identity politics as the standard for policy. The theory of epistemic communities explains how expert groups can influence policy through knowledge, authority, and claims of competence. Alum communities hold strategic positions in education, bureaucracy, or certification institutions; they can become normative brokers who translate global agendas into seemingly technical local policy formats, for example, through training modules, service guidelines, or suitability standards. This influence is often not seen as infiltration because it operates through professional language rather than overt propaganda, thus requiring research that can trace networks, narratives of legitimacy, and policy translation processes.

Bureaucratic career paths connected to global networks are also an important variable that shows how the war of interpretation of Pancasila is not always won by discourse, but by strategic positions in the machinery of government (Thontowi et al., 2024; Zamjani, 2022). The bureaucracy has a hierarchy, promotion mechanisms, and an organisational culture that can form internal coalitions to advance specific agendas. When actors fill key positions in education, social affairs, or religion with strong affiliations to specific moral networks, policies can shift through small decisions, such as choosing training resource persons, determining coaching materials, setting performance indicators, or changing service procedures. This is in line with the concept of institutional capture, namely the control of institutions through the placement of people, procedural rules, and control over resources. Capturing is not always illegal because it can occur within a legal space that exploits governance loopholes, so the analysis must be sensitive to formal-informal dynamics. This is where research on soft law and career networks becomes crucial, as it shows how power operates through routines rather than ideological declarations.

Indicators of changes in public attitudes and actions from the process of institutionalising moral norms such as this can be read as symptoms of a transformation in legitimacy (Toshkov et al., 2025). Increasing support for restrictions on minority groups indicates a shift from the principle of citizen equality to the principle of moral majoritarianism, in which rights are seen as dependent on conformity with values. The legitimisation of vigilante actions indicates a weakening of trust in the state's monopoly on law enforcement, as well as an increasing acceptance of social violence wrapped in moral claims.

The delegitimisation of state institutions signals a shift in the source of legitimacy from the constitution and democratic procedures towards the moral authority of groups (Moynihan, 2022). The narrowing of the space for interfaith dialogue shows that pluralism is no longer understood as a social condition to be managed, but as a threat to be eliminated. All of these indicators are consistent with the thesis that the war of interpretation of Pancasila has shifted from the symbolic arena to the normative-institutional arena, where not only the meaning of words but also the design of communal life is contested.

The need to understand the resilience of Pancasila is not only about strengthening the national narrative, but also about strengthening fair, transparent, and accountable institutional capacity in managing plurality. If the war of interpretation of Pancasila is carried out through curricula, apparatus training, family modules, local regulations, and social certification, then

the strategy to strengthen Pancasila is not enough to be a symbolic campaign, but must touch on the governance of norm production: how educational materials are compiled, how apparatus training is designed, how soft law is issued and supervised, and how standards of propriety are set so as not to be discriminatory.

Analysis must be able to distinguish between legitimate religious expression in the public sphere and institutional projects that turn religion into a tool for social control that negates citizens' equality. The biggest challenge lies in the grey area, when actions are carried out in the name of morality and social concern, but result in exclusion and polarisation. In such conditions, the war over the interpretation of Pancasila is not just a battle of ideas, but a battle over the design of citizenship: whether citizens are treated as equal subjects in a social contract or as objects of discipline in a moral regime imposed through institutions.

#### **D. Conclusion**

The dynamics of transnational religious movements interact with the resilience of the Pancasila ideology through three interlocking channels, namely an algorithm-based digital da'wah ecosystem that produces soft radicalisation and a shift in civic loyalty towards a political ummah, cross-border funding infrastructure that converts philanthropy into a force for social agenda setting and substitutes the functions of the state, and institutional strategies that engineer official norms through education, local regulations, bureaucracy, social certification, and soft law mechanisms that often escape public scrutiny. This synthesis reinforces and refines the findings of previous studies, which frequently ended at violent extremism, by showing that the erosion of national consensus more often occurs at the levels of discursive normalisation, service dependency, and the standardisation of piety that appears pious but gradually shifts constitutional legitimacy.

The theoretical implications encourage a shift in analysis from a narrow threat paradigm to an ideological-ecological resilience paradigm that combines the study of transnational movements, the political economy of philanthropy, and platform-based governance. The practical and policy implications demand strengthening ideological-digital literacy, funding transparency and social auditing, as well as reforming regulatory governance, including soft law, so that it does not become a channel for the normalisation of discrimination, while maintaining legitimate philanthropy and diversity within the framework of pluralism. The limitations of the study lie in its reliance on aggregate data and digital traces that do not always capture subjective motivations, the potential bias of platform user sample accessibility, and barriers to accessing sensitive transaction details and internal bureaucratic processes, so that the generalisation of findings should be read as contextually tested patterns, not universal claims. Further studies are recommended to refine the measurement of soft radicalisation and Pancasila resilience through longitudinal designs, mapping cross-border policies and alumni networks, evaluating the impact of soft law on public services, and conducting evidence-based policy experiments to test the most effective interventions.

#### **E. Acknowledgements**

The authors convey their profound appreciation to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their exacting appraisal and intellectually penetrating recommendations, which have appreciably strengthened the manuscript's conceptual precision and scholarly contribution.

#### **References**

Adeoye, M. A., & Noorhayati, S. M. (2024). Sacred bytes: Assessing the influence of social networks and virtual space on religious beliefs. *Journal of Social Science and Economics*, 3(1), 24-36. <https://doi.org/10.37812/josse.v3i1.1738>

Adhayanto, O., Nazaki, N., Rahmawati, N., Haryanti, D., Suwardi, N., & Pambudi, R. (2021). The strategy of strengthening Pancasila ideology in the digital age. *Pancasila and Law Review*, 2(2), 99–108. <https://doi.org/10.25041/plr.v2i2.2396>

Ahad, N. M. (2021). MIB Beyond the Classroom: Local Influencers and Their Impact on the Public Understanding of the State Philosophy. In *Globalisation, Education, and Reform in Brunei Darussalam* (pp. 305–321). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77119-5\\_15](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77119-5_15)

Al Hamid, R., Jamil, M. S., Nimah, R., & Siregar, M. A. H. (2025). Political Conflict between Islamic Law and National Law in Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, 1(1), 48–62. <https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.4>

Andok, M. (2024). The impact of online media on religious authority. *Religions*, 15(9), 1103. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15091103>

Arifin, F., Tedjabuwana, R., Wiyono, S., & Abdullah, M. K. bin. (2025). Indonesia's identity politics and populism: Disruption to national cohesion. *Jurnal Civics: Media Kajian Kewarganegaraan*, 22(1), 166–175. <https://doi.org/10.21831/jc.v22i1.1291>

Ayu, R. F., Albab, M. U., Yakin, M. A., & Hibbatulloh, I. (2025). Legal Challenges in Countering Religion-Based Terrorism in Asia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, 1(1), 1–15.

Bhatia, K. V. (2021). Religious subjectivities and digital collectivities on social networking sites in India. *Studies in Indian Politics*, 9(1), 21–36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2321023021999141>

Burelli, C., & Camboni, F. (2023). The function of solidarity and its normative implications. *Ethics & Global Politics*, 16(3), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2023.2241678>

Dawson, A. (2016). The politics and practice of religious diversity: national contexts, global issues. In *The politics and practice of religious diversity* (pp. 1–26). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315762555-1>

Doyle, N. J. (2019). Islam, depoliticization and the European crisis of democratic legitimacy. In *(Il) liberal Europe: Islamophobia, Modernity and Radicalization* (pp. 97–115). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315226699-7>

Ernest, P. (2024). The ethics of authority and control in mathematics education: From naked power to hidden ideology. In *Ethics and mathematics education: The good, the bad and the ugly* (pp. 199–249). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58683-5\\_12](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58683-5_12)

Gunawan, B., & Ratmono, B. M. (2018). Threats to the Ideology of Pancasila IntheReformEra: Praxis Case of Regional Development Policy. *Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan*, 9(1), 56–82. <https://doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2018.0057.56-82>

Hakim, L. N. (2023a). Islamism and Its Hegemonic Failure in Democratising Indonesia. In *Islamism and the Quest for Hegemony in Indonesia* (pp. 145–196). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9661-0\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9661-0_5)

Hakim, L. N. (2023b). Islamism in Indonesia: Setting the Stage. In *Islamism and the Quest for Hegemony in Indonesia* (pp. 1–28). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9661-0\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9661-0_1)

Hassan, S., Abubakar, F., & Sherif, I. A. (2025). The Ideological Dynamics of Pan-Islamism and Its Political Impact on Transnational Movements in the Contemporary Muslim World. *Nizham Journal of Islamic Studies*, 13(02), 57–71. <https://doi.org/10.32332/nizham.v13i02.11567>

Hayatullah, M., Rohman, M. A., & Gonzales, N. (2025). Analysis of Shiite Political Thought in Iran and Its Influence in Indonesia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, 1(1), 16–31.

Hidayah, H., Sa'ad, S., & Rosa, A. (2024). Transnational Islamic Movements In Indonesia. *Profetika: Jurnal Studi Islam*, 25(01), 55–66. <https://doi.org/10.23917/profetika.v25i01.2494>

Hidayah, M. A. (2024). Ideological contestation and gender policy reforms in post-reformasi Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 54(3), 363–386.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2023.2177558>

Karimov, N., Karimova, R.-B., Massimova, K., & Khajiyeva, G. (2024). Revitalizing faith: an inquiry into political Sufism and religious continuity in contemporary Kazakhstan. *Frontiers in Sociology*, 9, 1447966. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2024.1447966>

Karimullah, S. S. (2022). Moral Values Internalization of Pancasila in the Education System: A Response to the Problems of Radicalism. *Technical and Vocational Education International Journal (TAVEIJ)*, 2(01), 32-38.

Karimullah, S. S. (2023). Actualization of Pancasila As an Integrative Paradigm in Forming Imagination and Creativity. *Pancasila: Jurnal Keindonesiaan*, 3(1), 11-21. <https://doi.org/10.52738/pjk.v3i1.141>

Karimullah, S. S. (2024). The Use of music in islamic da'wah and its impact on audience emotional response. *Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah*, 44(2), 217-236. <https://doi.org/10.21580/jid.v44.2.20293>

Karimullah, S. S., Akbar, M. A. A. Q. M., Qhuraissy, A., Irawan, F., Sunatar, B. S. B., & Sugiharto, A. B. S. A. B. (2025). Pancasila Economy: Forgotten Dream or Weapon Against Inequality? *Jurnal Lemhannas RI*, 13(1), 103-117. <https://doi.org/10.55960/jlri.v13i1.1023>

Karimullah, S. S., Rahman, R., & Elmurtadho, F. (2023). Reflections of Prophetic Values on Strengthening Da'wah in the Digitalization Era. *Mawaizh: Jurnal Dakwah Dan Pengembangan Sosial Kemanusiaan*, 14(2), 134-154. <https://doi.org/10.32923/maw.v14i2.3279>

Karimullah, S. S., Said, N. M., Wasalmi, W., & Syafi'i, A. G. (2023). Da'wah for Social Justice: Creating Awareness of Social Issues Through a Religious Approach. *Jurnal Dakwah Risalah*, 34(2), 110-128. <https://doi.org/10.24014/jdr.v34i2.25373>

Keane, J. (2018). Structural transformations of the public sphere. In *The Media, Journalism and Democracy* (pp. 53-74). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315189772-5>

Kim, M. S. (2024). Agonizing Pancasila: Indonesia's state ideology and post-foundational political thought. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1-23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2024.2408230>

Lawless, B., & Chen, Y.-W. (2019). Developing a method of critical thematic analysis for qualitative communication inquiry. *Howard Journal of Communications*, 30(1), 92-106. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10646175.2018.1439423>

Lizzio-Wilson, M., Mirnajafi, Z., & Louis, W. R. (2022). Who we are and who we choose to help (or not): An introduction to social identity theory. In *Solidarity and social justice in contemporary societies: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding inequalities* (pp. 17-28). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_2)

Marques, E., & Bichir, R. (2024). Policy change in socially embedded local policy processes in São Paulo, 1988-2020. *Policy Studies*, 45(6), 908-928. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2244896>

Marshall, K. (2018). Global education challenges: Exploring religious dimensions. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 62, 184-191. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2018.04.005>

McFadden, K. (2025). Infrastructures of social reproduction: Schools, everyday urban life, and the built environment of education. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 15(1), 96-115. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20438206231178827>

Mendes Junior, I. de J. A., & Alves, M. D. C. (2023). Evidence of neo-bureaucracy and institutional isomorphism in the implementation and functioning of the balanced scorecard: A case study. *Cogent Business & Management*, 10(1), 2176462. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2023.2176462>

Mohiuddin, A. (2023). Islamist Movements: Evolution, Approaches and Contestation. In *Navigating Religious Authority in Muslim Societies: Islamist Movements and the Challenge*

of Globalisation (pp. 73–115). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44825-6_3)

Moynihan, D. (2022). Delegitimization, deconstruction and control: Undermining the administrative state. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 699(1), 36–49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162211069723>

Mukaromah, S. A., Gusmawan, A., & Munandar, J. (2022). The Lunge of Global Ideologies: The Challenges of Pancasila Ideology Education in the Middle of Global Existence in the Era of Globalization. *Jurnal Panjar: Pengabdian Bidang Pembelajaran*, 4(1), 1–30. <https://doi.org/10.15294/panjar.v4i1.55017>

Nurizka, M. S., Islami, A., Rofieh, M., & Dzulfikar, M. L. (2025). Criticism of the Neoclassical Approach in Islamic Economic Policy in Indonesia. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, 1(1), 17–30. <https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.9>

Nurizka, M. S., Jamil, M. S., & Sholeh, B. (2025). Analysis of the Impact of Sharia Regulations on Halal Trade in Southeast Asia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, 1(1), 32–47. <https://doi.org/10.65586/jli.v1i1.16>

Papakyriakopoulos, O., Hegelich, S., Shahrezaye, M., & Serrano, J. C. M. (2018). Social media and microtargeting: Political data processing and the consequences for Germany. *Big Data & Society*, 5(2), 205395171881184. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951718811844>

Papathanassopoulos, S., & Giannouli, I. (2025). Political Communication in the Age of Platforms. *Encyclopedia*, 5(2), 77. <https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5020077>

Pertamawati, T., Rukiyanto, B. A., & Asifarani, E. (2025). Negotiating Religious Identity in State Schools Within the Flow of National Curriculum Policy. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, 1(2), 76–91. <https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i2.19>

Prakoso, P., Rohman, F., & Handoyo, E. (2024). Pancasila as a foundation for legal reform: Evaluating the impact of civic education on Indonesian legal systems. *Journal of Law and Legal Reform*, 5(3). <https://doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v5i3.16498>

Pratiwi, E. D., Darmawan, D. D., Fachrudi, F. A. N., Suganda, F. A., & Sundawa, D. (2025). Pancasila-based democratic education and civil society development amid Indonesia's democratic regression. *Sospol*, 11(2), 146–159. <https://doi.org/10.22219/jurnalsospol.v1i2.38273>

Rembulan, C., Maghfur, I. R., Siregar, M. A. H., Jakfar, M. A., & Solehah, S. (2025). The Impact of the Digital Economy on Economic Empowerment Models for Muslim Youth in Indonesia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, 1(1), 48–63. <https://doi.org/10.65586/jli.v1i1.17>

Rijal, S. (2022). The origins of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Global and local interactions. *Islamic Studies Review*, 1(1), 110–127. <https://doi.org/10.56529/isr.v1i1.22>

Rijal, S. (2025). Pursuing hijrah to Salafi path: urban Muslim youth and the quest for self-transformation in Indonesia. *Contemporary Islam*, 19(1), 101–121. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-024-00564-x>

Shabazz, D. R., & Cooks, L. M. (2022). The pedagogy of community service-learning discourse: From deficit to asset mapping in the re-envisioning media project. *Journal of Community Engagement and Scholarship*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.54656/NJKZ2684>

Shah, H. A. R., Zada, K., Ali, N. M., & Sahid, M. M. (2022). Peace in ASEAN: Counter-narrative strategies against the ideologies of radicalism and extremism (Goal 16). In *Good Governance and the Sustainable Development Goals in Southeast Asia* (pp. 194–211). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003230724-17>

Shier, M. L., & Van-Du, B. (2018). Framing curriculum development in social work education about social enterprises: a scoping literature review. *Social Work Education*, 37(8), 995–1014. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02615479.2018.1493098>

Sprinzak, E. (2014). Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization. In *Terror from the extreme right* (pp. 17–43). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315036342-2>

Sudirta, I. W., Pieris, J., Nugroho, W., & Ryantoni, H. (2025). Explore the Values of Pancasila

as the Basic Philosophy of the Indonesian Nation. *Arena Hukum*, 18(1), 127-158. <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.arenahukum2025.01801.6>

Suharto, T. (2018). Transnational Islamic education in Indonesia: an ideological perspective. *Contemporary Islam*, 12(2), 101-122. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0409-3>

Tava, F. (2023). Justice, emotions, and solidarity. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 26(1), 39-55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2021.1893251>

Thontowi, J., Wati, E., Jamil, A., & Nurjihad, N. (2024). Transformation of Pancasila and the Rule of Law: A Comparative Study and Analysis of National Development Before and After Government Reformation. *SHS Web of Conferences*, 204, 7011. <https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202420407011>

Toshkov, D., Mazepus, H., Yordanova, N., & Piqani, D. (2025). Enforcement and public opinion: The perceived legitimacy of rule of law sanctions. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 32(2), 550-577. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2320274>

Tsuria, R., & Yadlin-Segal, A. (2021). Digital religion and global media: Flows, communities, and radicalizations. *Handbook of Global Media Ethics*, 157-175. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32103-5\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32103-5_10)

Wahyono, Z., Gamon, A. D., & Shah, M. A. (2024). Religious Tolerance in Southeast Asia: Issues and Challenges. *Al-Itqan: Journal of Islamic Sciences and Comparative Studies*, 9(2), 24-53. <https://doi.org/10.31436/alitqan.v9i2.297>

Wahyudi, Mahrus, Kurniyadi, Munawwarah, U. D., & Khoiruddin. (2025). Carl Rogers' Humanistic Approach in Character Education in Pesantren. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, 1(1), 31-45. <https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.10>

Wajdi, F. (2020). Transnational Religious Movement: The Turkish Süleymanlı in Indonesia. In *Routledge International Handbook of Religion in Global Society* (pp. 258-267). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315646435-21>

Werner, D. (2024). Religious Education and Ecumenical Formation in Post-confessional Settings-Essentials for the Theological Education of Pastors and Teachers of Religion. *International Journal of Practical Theology*, 28(1), 135-157. <https://doi.org/10.1515/ijpt-2024-0035>

Whyte, S. A. (2022). Islamic religious authority in cyberspace: A qualitative study of Muslim religious actors in Australia. *Religions*, 13(1), 69. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13010069>

Wiranti, B., Latif, F. A., Hibbatulloh, I., Sakinah, H., & Hidayatullah, M. W. (2025). Political Feminism and Women's Representation in Public Policy in Indonesia. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, 1(1), 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.11>

Wronka, C. (2024). Crypto-asset regulatory landscape: a comparative analysis of the crypto-asset regulation in the UK and Germany. *Journal of Asset Management*, 25(4), 417-426. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41260-024-00358-z>

Yuwono, A. T., ter Braake, G., & Clumpers, P.-J. (2025). Ethics of Writing History in the Axiological Perspective of Pancasila. *Pancasila: Jurnal Keindonesiaan*, 5(2), 216-233. <https://doi.org/10.52738/pjk.v5i2.849>

Zamjani, I. (2022). The politics of educational decentralisation in Indonesia. A *Quest for Legitimacy*. Springer Nature. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6901-9>

Ziskin, M. B. (2019). Critical discourse analysis and critical qualitative inquiry: data analysis strategies for enhanced understanding of inference and meaning. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 32(6), 606-631. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2019.1609118>