Jurnal Pelita Raya
e-ISSN: 3110-584X
Vol. 1 No. 2, August 2025: 106-121
DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

Analysis of Deradicalisation Strategies Through Family Programmes in Indonesia

Godlif Sianipar[1*], Hasmia Wahyunisa[2], Rizqa Febry Ayu[3], Mawaddatul Ulfa[4], M. Aguswal Fajri[5]

[1] *Universitas Katolik Santo Thomas, Medan, Indonesia*
[2] *Institut Agama Islam DDI Sidenreng Rappang, Indonesia*
[3] *Akademi Keperawatan Teungku Fakinah Banda Aceh, Indonesia*
[4] *Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Syariah, Kebumen, Indonesia*
[5] *Universitas Islam Negeri Imam Bonjol, Padang, Indonesia*

**Author's correspondence email: godlif_sianipar@ust.ac.id*

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:
Deradicalisation, Family, Ideology, Radicalism, Terrorism

***DOI**:*
10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

***Article History**:*
Submitted: 15-03-2025
Revised: 17-05-2025
Accepted: 20-07-2025
Published online: 12-08-2025

Published by:
Mahkota Science Publishers

ABSTRACT

This study develops a new paradigm of deradicalisation that positions the family as the leading actor, rather than merely the object of policy. Through the integration of a multidisciplinary approach and multi-stakeholder engagement, this study seeks to formulate a deradicalisation strategy that not only addresses the surface symptoms of radicalism but also the socio-cultural, psychological, and structural roots that drive it. This study applies a library research method, integrating key theories and empirical findings from multiple disciplines to gain a comprehensive understanding of family-based deradicalisation strategies in Indonesia. The results confirm that deradicalisation strategies through family programmes in Indonesia are a fundamental approach, but cannot be separated from the dynamics of internal conflict, generational change, and increasingly complex digital and social challenges. The family can indeed be an initial filter and strategic space in preventing radicalism, but its effectiveness depends heavily on its capacity for dialogue, digital literacy, and adaptability to changing times, as well as tangible support from the state and communities that strengthen the surrounding social ecosystem. State intervention in the private sphere of the family must be carried out sensitively and participatively, not through repressive surveillance, but through empowerment and facilitation of critical discussion spaces that build family resilience without sacrificing its autonomy.

A. Introduction

Family-based deradicalisation strategies are essential and urgent amid the failure of various conventional deradicalisation efforts that prioritise repressive and curative approaches over preventive ones. Most deradicalisation policies in Indonesia have been stuck in a reactive pattern, only taking action after acts of terrorism have occurred or when perpetrators have already entered the legal system (Barton & Vergani, 2021). In fact, approaches that place too much emphasis on law enforcement tend to scratch only the surface of the problem, without addressing the roots of radicalism that thrive at the community and family levels. A new paradigm that emphasises prevention and family empowerment is expected to build resilience early, before individuals are further exposed to radical doctrines.

The urgency of involving families in deradicalisation strategies is also reinforced by the global phenomenon of women and children's involvement in terrorist networks. Many studies show that terrorist networks have now adopted new patterns that involve family members collectively, whether in recruitment, training, or carrying out actions (Alakoc et al., 2023; Marone, 2023; Scremin, 2023; Yazid et al., 2023). The phenomenon of suicide bombings involving a family in Surabaya in 2018 is a clear illustration of how families can be effective instruments for radical groups in spreading their ideology and carrying out their actions. This fact also serves as an alarm for the government, authorities, and society to immediately reorient their strategy to counter radicalism, placing families at the centre of the prevention ecosystem. Deradicalisation programmes that ignore the family dimension will always be one step behind the modus operandi of radical groups, which continue to adapt to the latest social and technological developments.

An issue often overlooked by the public and policymakers is that families, as social institutions, are not homogeneous. Each family has different dynamics, capacities, and vulnerabilities in facing the threat of radicalism. Many families in Indonesia live in economic hardship, have minimal access to quality education, and live in fragile social environments (Kusumaningrum et al., 2022; Nugroho et al., 2021). In this context, the presence of the state is significant in providing appropriate intervention through family empowerment programmes that are not only symbolic but also substantive.

Programmes such as strengthening family resilience, digital literacy, strengthening character education, and facilitating interfaith dialogue must be integrated into a holistic national deradicalisation framework (Wibowo & Ahmed, 2024). Without policies that are sensitive to the diversity of family characteristics, deradicalisation strategies risk becoming short-term projects that are unable to build collective resilience in the face of long-term threats.

At the implementation level, various family-based deradicalisation programmes launched by the government and civil society organisations in Indonesia still face several serious structural and cultural challenges. The main obstacles lie in inter-agency coordination, budget constraints, and low levels of community participation. Many deradicalisation programmes remain sectoral and are not integrated across sectors such as education, religion, social affairs, and technology. On the other hand, community resistance to the stigma of former terrorism convicts and their families remains very high, adding to the complexity of the social reintegration process.

Often, the families of former terrorists become repeat victims of stigmatisation and social exclusion, so that deradicalisation efforts, which should be empowerment-based, turn into mere monitoring and control without adequate psychosocial recovery. This is counterproductive because isolated families are more easily exposed to radical propaganda that offers false acceptance and solidarity.

On the other hand, there is a fundamental problem with the programmatic approach used in family deradicalisation strategies. Many deradicalisation initiatives place too much emphasis on the religious dimension alone, as if radicalism were rooted solely in a misguided understanding of religion. In fact, the roots of radicalism are very complex, involving

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

economic, social and psychological aspects, as well as past trauma. The experiences of several families show that poverty, structural injustice, and experiences of discrimination or state violence are often powerful catalysts for growing disappointment and alienation, which radical groups then manipulate.

Various previous scientific studies provide an essential foundation for strengthening the argument for a family-based deradicalisation strategy in Indonesia. One of the primary references is the research by Riany *et al.,* (2019), which highlights the dynamics of radicalism in Indonesia by underscoring that radicalisation occurs not only in public spaces or large communities but also within the family environment. Another highly relevant study comes from Muhammad and Hiariej (2021), who explored the effectiveness of the Indonesian government's deradicalisation policies. Their findings show that most government deradicalisation programmes still focus too much on legal and security dimensions, neglecting the cultural and social aspects that exist within families.

Several previous studies have highlighted the importance of integrating moderate religious education into the family environment (Arifin, 2016; Dasopang et al., 2023; Nurhayati & Hamid, 2020). Through qualitative research in several major cities in Indonesia, they found that families that build open, inclusive, and moderate religious discourse are more resistant to the infiltration of radical doctrines. Several other studies also highlight the importance of community support in assisting families of former terrorists (Koehler & Ehrt, 2018; Mubaraq et al., 2022; Pemberton, 2010; Sporer & Buxton, 2024; Wildan, 2021). These studies remind us that social reintegration will not be effective if the families of former perpetrators continue to face stigma and discrimination from their surrounding communities. Therefore, deradicalisation efforts must be complemented by community-strengthening programmes that foster empathy, solidarity, and openness.

Based on the above literature review, it can be concluded that family-based deradicalisation strategies have become an essential concern in academic discourse and public policy in Indonesia. Yet, their implementation continues to face many challenges. All studies emphasise the urgency of shifting the focus from a purely legal and security approach to a holistic approach that integrates character education, digital literacy, economic empowerment, women's involvement, and the strengthening of local community networks. Based on these empirical findings and gaps in the study, this study aims to critically analyse deradicalisation strategies through family programmes in Indonesia, taking into account the ever-evolving social, economic, cultural, and technological dynamics.

B. Method

This study applies the library research method by integrating key theories and empirical findings from across disciplines to understand family-based deradicalisation strategies in Indonesia comprehensively. By examining literature from sociology, psychology, education, gender and security, this study places the family at the centre of the process of preventing radicalism. Bandura's Social Learning Theory (Crain, 2015), Family Resilience, and Bronfenbrenner's Ecology are used to explain how radical behaviour and values can develop and be transmitted within the domestic environment (Masten, 2018; Walsh, 2016), and how interactions among families, communities, and state policies can influence them. This integration is enriched by empirical findings on the roles of digital literacy, family economic empowerment, and the transformation of women's roles, which have proven significant in strengthening family resilience to radicalism.

More than just a description of the literature, this approach establishes critical connections between theory and empirical reality, enabling the identification of patterns of success and failure in deradicalisation strategies implemented. Durkheim's Theory of Social Disintegration and Gender and Social Roles also complement the analysis of family vulnerability and the need to strengthen women's capacity as the leading agents in instilling

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

values of tolerance. Thus, this study not only strengthens the academic foundation for the importance of family-based deradicalisation strategies but also offers a contextual and applicable synthesis of ideas for policy, enabling families to function optimally as the primary bulwark against the threat of radicalism in Indonesia's dynamic and diverse society.

C. Results and Discussion

1. The Effectiveness of the Family as the Last Line of Defence in Deradicalisation

The effectiveness of the family as a filter for deradicalisation is closely related to the social capital it possesses, whether in the form of communication networks, trust among members, or access to balanced sources of knowledge and information. This social capital determines the extent to which families can identify early changes in their family members' attitudes, behaviour, or ideological preferences. In the Indonesian context, the values of cooperation, deliberation, and joint decision-making, alive in the traditions of the Nusantara family, constitute a latent force that can be utilised as the foundation for family-based deradicalisation. However, reality shows that not all families have sufficient social capital.

Families in busy urban areas, broken homes, or families under high economic pressure often find it challenging to perform their social protection function optimally (Zheng et al., 2025). It is also essential to look at the effectiveness of the family as the primary filter for deradicalisation through the lens of digital technology development and changes in the communication patterns of the younger generation. The digital era has brought fundamental changes to the structure of family communication; virtual spaces offer opportunities, but also serious challenges. Today, children and adolescents access information, build social networks, and search for their identity more in the virtual world than in the family space (Núñez-Gómez et al., 2021; Wati et al., 2022). When family digital literacy is low, the gap for radical ideas to enter becomes wider. Propaganda and recruitment by radical groups can now easily infiltrate through social media platforms, chat applications, and online games, often without being detected by parents.

In this situation, the family is no longer an effective primary filter but rather the weakest link in the ecosystem for preventing radicalism (Zych & Nasaescu, 2022). This is exacerbated by parents' lack of skills in identifying signs of changes in their children's digital behaviour, as well as a lack of open dialogue on sensitive issues such as religion, politics, and identity. On the other hand, institutional or state approaches through macro-level policies, regulations, and deradicalisation programmes have advantages in terms of reach, resources, and authority. The state can initiate character education programmes, anti-radicalism curricula, national digital literacy initiatives, and tolerance campaigns involving educational institutions, religious communities, and the mass media.

State security and intelligence apparatus also have the capacity to detect and take action against radical networks that operate systematically and in an organised manner (Cross, 2023). However, the effectiveness of the state's approach is not without structural challenges, such as bureaucratic fragmentation, cultural resistance, and the potential for human rights violations. Many state programmes are top-down, less responsive to local wisdom, and do not adequately accommodate community aspirations. In some cases, state deradicalisation programmes have even caused distrust among the public because they are perceived as prioritising a security approach over a humanitarian and restorative approach (Glazzard, 2025; Ogunnubi & Aja, 2024).

Thus, there is a dichotomy between the bottom-up family approach and the top-down state approach. A critical analysis is needed to avoid oversimplifying the idea that families are automatically capable of being an effective primary filter against radicalism. Various studies show that radicalism often flourishes precisely because the state fails to deliver social justice, provide access to quality education, and uphold a non-discriminatory rule of law. In this context, the burden of deradicalisation cannot be placed entirely on families. The state must

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

continue to carry out its macro social protection functions, providing early warning systems, counselling facilities, and social reintegration mechanisms for victims and perpetrators of radicalism.

The family, as the last bastion, will only be effective if a supportive social environment exists. These state policies favour family empowerment and synergy between religious institutions, education, and local communities. One significant challenge is the gap between state regulations and the capacity to implement them at the family level. Many deradicalisation programmes fail because they do not take into account the local context, the economic burden on families, and limited access to psychosocial support services. As a result, vulnerable families become increasingly isolated and easy targets for radical propaganda.

In Indonesia, empirical evidence shows variations in the effectiveness of family deradicalisation, driven by factors such as social class, urbanisation, educational background, and religious and cultural diversity (Ilyas & Athwal, 2021; Muhammad & Hiariej, 2021). In areas with cohesive communities and strong mutual aid values, families are relatively better able to serve as the primary filter against radicalism. However, in areas with social conflict, extreme poverty, or marginalisation, families tend to lose their bargaining power and even become spaces for the intergenerational reproduction of radical ideology. In some cases, families are no longer a stronghold but have instead become the main base for recruitment, training, and strengthening radical networks, as seen in several suicide bombing cases involving entire families (Santhana Dass, 2021).

This phenomenon shows that the family is not always synonymous with a safe zone, but can also be a gateway to radicalism when it experiences structural and relational dysfunction. Many family-based deradicalisation programmes end up as jargon without real implementation, or as mere complements to administrative reporting requirements. On the other hand, civil society and local communities are often not optimally involved in supporting families in performing their filtering function.

In fact, the stigmatisation of the families of former terrorists slows down the process of social reintegration and creates obstacles. Often, the families of victims become isolated, lose economic access, and experience prolonged trauma that is ignored by the state. In situations like this, it is challenging for families to function as a stronghold, and they can even become targets for recruitment by radical groups that offer false solidarity and material incentives.

The comparison of effectiveness between families and the state's institutional approach must also be viewed in the context of sustainability. Families have advantages in terms of intimacy, continuity of interaction, and long-term influence on their members (Cooke et al., 2023). However, the state has the authority, resources, and capacity to intervene systemically. The ideal model is the integration of these two approaches. The state should not eliminate its macro-intervention function. Still, it should transform it into real support for families—not only through regulations, but also through training programmes, access to counselling, digital literacy, and the facilitation of interfaith and intergenerational dialogue within families. Such synergy enables the creation of a strong social resilience ecosystem, in which families and the state support each other.

The effectiveness of the family as the last bastion of deradicalisation is primarily determined by the extent to which the state and the community can provide a supportive ecosystem. Families cannot work alone without the support of a healthy social environment, access to educational resources, economic support, and fair legal protection (Ravalier et al., 2022). Meanwhile, the state will never be effective if it relies solely on coercive approaches and formal programmes without internalising values in the domestic environment. Real collaboration between the state, families, local communities, educational institutions, and civil society organisations is the key to successful, sustainable and effective deradicalisation. In the context of Indonesia's diverse and dynamic society, placing the family at the centre of efforts to prevent radicalism is a strategic choice that cannot be implemented partially or

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

symbolically; it must be built on a foundation of synergy, empowerment, and continuous support from all elements of the nation.

Understanding this complexity, the narrative of the family as the last bastion of deradicalisation must be articulated not as political rhetoric or moral jargon, but as the result of critical reflection on Indonesia's social reality today. The success of this strategy depends heavily on the commitment of all parties to build a social ecosystem that is fair, inclusive, and based on universal human values. Only in this way can Indonesian families truly become an effective primary filter, rather than merely a passive shield, in facing the challenges of radicalism that continue to transform in the era of globalisation and digitalisation.

2. Internal Challenges and Resistance: Ideology, Tradition, and Generational Conflict within the Family

Ideological conflict within Indonesian families cannot be separated from the power relations inherent in patriarchal and matriarchal family traditions, as well as how the roles and voices of children are often marginalised. Parents, especially fathers in patriarchal structures, are positioned as guardians of tradition and sole interpreters of religious truth and family morality (Karimullah, 2023; Karimullah, Efendi, et al., 2023). Any deviation from the grand narrative they believe in is considered a threat, not only to the family structure but also to social pride. In many cases, parents' reactions to their children's ideological changes are primarily determined by their level of religious literacy, capacity for dialogue, and experiences of trauma or a history of violence within the family itself (Jean-Berluche, 2024). Instead of creating a space for critical dialogue and empathy, the response is often repression, exclusion, or even physical and psychological violence under the pretext of saving the child from misguidance.

In some instances, families even become a battleground for interpretations of tradition and modernity. Younger generations who begin to question family doctrines, reject certain traditions, or show allegiance to universal values such as human rights, freedom of expression, or pluralism often face fierce resistance from parents who feel that their traditions are being undermined (Hidayat et al., 2024). On the other hand, many young people reject pluralism, interpret religion scripturally, and consider compromising with tradition to be a form of moral decadence that must be fought. This phenomenon of reverse radicalism is not merely the result of transnational ideological infiltration, but also reflects the absence of local narratives relevant to young people's current reality. When families fail to answer the existential questions of their younger members, or refuse to renew their interpretation of values, that space will be filled by other narratives that are more radical, more black-and-white, and more tempting because they offer certainty amid the complexity of life.

Traditions in Indonesian families, whether based on religion or customs, are often a double-edged sword in dealing with the dynamics of radicalism. On the one hand, tradition can be a bulwark against the infiltration of foreign ideologies by instilling values such as cooperation, solidarity, and respect among family members. However, on the other hand, tradition is also often used as a means of justifying symbolic and structural violence when one family member begins to differ or deviate. The norm of absolute obedience to parents, the taboo of openly discussing religion and politics, and the culture of hiding conflict to maintain false harmony often allow radicalism to develop beneath the surface, making it difficult to detect and leading to shock or regret when extremism has already reached its lowest point. This condition is exacerbated by the family's failure to critically adapt traditions in the face of modern challenges, so that blind obedience to tradition becomes fertile ground for the development of intolerant, exclusive, and even anti-dialogue ideologies (Hayatullah, Ikhsan, et al., 2025).

Internal resistance within families often occurs not only between parents and children, but also between siblings, uncles and aunts, and even grandparents who have different

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

educational backgrounds, experiences, and life orientations. When one family member becomes exposed to radicalism, relationship patterns change drastically: pro and anti groups form, internal factions emerge, and rumours, accusations and mutual suspicion become rampant among family members. In such conditions, the family can become a microcosm of broader social conflict, with some wanting to save, some wanting to get rid of, some choosing to remain silent for fear of stigma, and others secretly supporting because they feel there is a truth that is not publicly acknowledged. This pattern of conflict becomes even more complicated when exacerbated by economic problems, inheritance disputes, or unresolved conflicts.

The older generation, who feel entitled to define the truth, often clash with the younger generation, which demands space, recognition, and participation in determining family values. In many cases, young people who have been exposed to radicalism use digital technology to build identity networks outside the family. They find new communities, mentors, and discussion forums that offer counter-narratives, even openly teaching doctrines of opposition to parents if they are considered incompatible with Sharia or too compromising with systemic immorality (Nurizka, Jamil, et al., 2025). This phenomenon shows how communication crises, unequal relationships, and stagnant traditional renewal open wide gaps for radical narratives to infiltrate and take root.

One of the biggest challenges in ideological conflicts within families is the failure to establish equal dialogue and safe discussion spaces. Most Indonesian families still practise one-way communication dominated by parental authority. Children who try to discuss religion, politics, or diversity from a critical perspective are often considered rebellious, influenced by a bad environment, or disrespectful. In fact, crucial dialogue on an equal footing is essential to building family immunity to radicalism (Al Hamid et al., 2025; Kurniawan et al., 2025; Nuriskandar et al., 2025; Wiranti et al., 2025). Families that create spaces for open discussion, empathy, and appreciation of differences are relatively better able to detect and respond to the early signs of radicalisation. However, making this space is not easy. The biggest obstacles are the fear of open conflict, the concern about losing authority, and the reluctance to acknowledge weaknesses in parenting and family values. Many families choose to sweep problems under the carpet, hoping that time will heal the wounds or that their children will come to their senses on their own (Muttaqin et al., 2025; Parhi et al., 2025).

The phenomenon of internal resistance is also evident in families that have been collectively exposed to radicalism. In some cases, all family members reinforce each other's radical beliefs. The process of ideological transmission occurs intensively through religious rituals, internal discussions, and the shared consumption of radical content. Families like this become closed enclaves that are anti-external dialogue, reject state assistance, and view neighbours or outsiders as threats. In situations like this, deradicalisation efforts are strenuous to carry out from the outside, and even approaches by state or community officials are often seen as kafir (unbeliever) disturbances that must be resisted. The greater challenge is how the state and society can intervene through approaches that do not trigger deeper resistance, for example, through informal education, economic facilitation, or interventions based on local wisdom that are accepted by their communities (Nurizka, Islami, et al., 2025; Rifa'i et al., 2025; Wahyudi et al., 2025).

Ideological conflicts within families also often cause psychological trauma, feelings of failure, and a deep sense of meaninglessness, especially for parents who feel they have lost control over their children or the families they love. Often, the burden of guilt and shame is felt not only by the immediate family but also extends to the broader social environment. In many cases, families of radicalisation victims choose to isolate themselves, sever social ties, and even sacrifice personal aspirations to cover up family shame. This situation actually triggers a broader cycle of radicalisation: children who feel unrecognised or rejected by their

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

families will increasingly seek refuge in new communities that offer unconditional acceptance, while reinforcing their belief that their old families are indeed not worth preserving.

Another challenge that is often overlooked is how this ideological conflict also intersects with issues of gender, economics, and education. Families with limited economic resources, low levels of education, or restricted access to critical information tend to be more vulnerable to radical narratives and find it more challenging to establish a space for dialogue (Rembulan et al., 2025; Riandi et al., 2025). In families with unequal gender relations, women often lose their voice, even when they realise that something is wrong with the direction of change in values at home (Fathony et al., 2024; Karimullah, Nugraha, et al., 2023; Malik et al., 2025). In crises, women become double victims: caught between family loyalty, anxiety about their children's future, and the lack of a safe space to express their concerns or seek help (Karimullah & Sugitanata, 2024). The state and civil society also often fail to develop psychosocial support systems that are sensitive to the complexity of internal family conflicts.

Meanwhile, deradicalisation efforts carried out by the state or civil society institutions often fall short because they fail to understand the complexity of internal family conflicts. Top-down approaches that prioritise security logic or administrative instructions are not practical enough to penetrate the layers of internal resistance built in the name of tradition, pride, or family loyalty. In some cases, the state's approach actually reinforces the narrative of a common enemy, fuels internal family solidarity, and accelerates the radicalisation process of members who have already been exposed. The state tends to ignore the fact that ideological conflicts within families are organic phenomena that can only be addressed with empathy, patience, and long-term dialogue grounded in trust, not power.

Generational conflicts over ideology within Indonesian families have become more acute as developments in information technology unfold. Young people have broad access to online communities that are often more receptive and progressive in discussing sensitive issues. They place more trust in the authority of digital influencers, online discussion forums, or even transnational religious figures who are unknown to their families. This adds a new layer to internal conflicts as parents lose narrative authority, lose control over information consumption patterns, and often respond with prohibitions, repression, or attempts to cut off digital access, which are only temporary. As a result, the radicalisation process becomes even more hidden and difficult to track. Children who are banned become even more curious, build dual identities (online and offline), and distance themselves from family communication spaces that they feel are no longer relevant.

Provocation of radicalism also often takes the form of slow infiltration through gaps of dissatisfaction within the family. Parents' failure to meet economic expectations, domestic disputes, or experiences of violence within the family become entry points for radical narratives that offer justice, certainty, and a new community. Radical doctrines often utilise anti-establishment and anti-liberal rhetoric, as well as promises of happiness in the afterlife, to fill the void of meaning and hope that the family has failed to fulfil. In situations like this, the family's internal resistance becomes fragile, and some even abandon children or family members who have been exposed to radicalism because they are no longer a shared responsibility, allowing the radicalisation process to proceed unhindered.

From a family psychology perspective, ideological conflicts resulting from radicalisation cause parental burnout, excessive stress, depression, and anxiety about the family's future. Many parents experience prolonged trauma, haunted by feelings of failure in raising their children, and even lose their sense of purpose after discovering that their children or family members have become part of a radical network. Many families end up seeking help from religious leaders, psychologists, or government agencies, but often encounter dead ends due to stigma, bureaucracy, or the lack of an integrated support system. Meanwhile, children or family members who have been exposed also experience psychological pressure, identity

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

division, and even depression because they feel that they are not entirely accepted in their old or new communities.

Efforts to rebuild family harmony and resilience amid ideological conflict require more than just moral advice or religious sermons. A multidimensional approach is needed that combines psychological counselling, family narrative reconstruction, facilitation of cross-generational dialogue, and family economic empowerment. The state and civil society need to create a safe space for families to discuss conflicts without stigma, provide access to community-based psychosocial services, and develop a critical, context-specific family education system (Karimullah, 2022; Karimullah et al., 2025). Participatory, trust-based, and locally diverse approaches are far more effective than coercive strategies or one-way deradicalisation campaigns.

The dynamics of ideological, traditional, and generational conflicts within Indonesian families when faced with the infiltration of radicalism constitute a complex, provocative battlefield of values that will determine the nation's future direction. Families are not always able to act as the primary filter if they lack adequate capacity for dialogue, access to information, and economic and psychosocial resilience. Traditions that are not critically reflected upon can backfire, while generational conflicts that are not managed with empathy risk adding to the long list of young people who have lost meaning and chosen the path of radicalism. The state, civil society, and local communities must be present not as judges but as partners in the long journey of building inclusive, resilient, and resistant Indonesian families. Only in this way can Indonesian families remain safe havens, rather than silent battlegrounds that kill hope.

3. The Dilemma of State Intervention in the Private Sphere of the Family

One of the most heated controversies surrounding state intervention in the family concerns the limits of public interest versus private rights. The state often argues that national security is the highest public interest, so that all forms of intervention, including those that enter the family space, can be justified. However, the family as a social institution does not always submit to the formal logic of the state. Family-based deradicalisation practices, for example, are often seen as a threat to the family's internal autonomy, mainly when carried out coercively, top-down, and without a dialogical approach. The state, through its apparatus, often prefers an administrative approach, prioritising data, surveillance, and even labelling certain families as risky, without considering the complexity of emotional, power, and psychosocial dynamics within households.

In Indonesia, state efforts to enter the family sphere in deradicalisation programmes often face two equally problematic realities. First, there is strong cultural resistance from the community, especially in areas that still uphold local traditions and customs. State intervention is often seen as a new form of colonisation that threatens the moral authority of families and communities. Second, there is the potential for abuse of power, whereby deradicalisation programmes become a tool for stigmatisation, labelling, or even repression of certain families based on suspicion or religious and ethnic stereotypes. In many cases, the families of former terrorists or those considered at risk of exposure to radicalism experience social exclusion, economic hardship, and multiple layers of psychological trauma as a result of stigmatisation by the state and society (Ayu et al., 2025; Hayatullah, Rohman, et al., 2025).

The issue becomes even more complicated when state deradicalisation programmes operate within a security framework that tends to view every family as a potential threat rather than as subjects of empowerment. In many training sessions for officials, the primary focus is on identifying, monitoring, and reporting suspicious families rather than on building spaces for dialogue, facilitation, or participatory family empowerment.

This approach has the potential to sever communication between the state and society, and even encourage vulnerable families to become more closed off. Stigma, fear, and suspicion

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

flourish, hindering the process of social reintegration and opening up new space for radical narratives that use state oppression as fuel for ideological resistance. This dilemma is even more acute when the state must make quick decisions in the face of real and often brutal terrorist threats.

The state's decision to enter the private sphere of the family is often based on risk calculations that take the human rights and privacy of citizens into secondary consideration. In crises, security rationality becomes dominant, drowning out principles of family rights protection, fair legal processes, and recovery-based approaches. The state efficiently issues regulations that allow for intensive surveillance, mandatory reporting, and even the use of digital technology to monitor the activities of certain families. However, the critical question is: to what extent is state intervention acceptable to the public? When should the state step back and give families the space to resolve their own problems?

This question is particularly relevant in the Indonesian context, where the history of state authoritarianism has left deep collective wounds. Many families, especially those from minority groups or those who have been victims of political labelling, are susceptible to any form of state intervention. Any policy that regulates family life in detail, even under the pretext of deradicalisation, is prone to being perceived as excessive social control (Ahdash, 2024). This resistance is even stronger if state programmes are implemented without dialogue, public consultation, or the involvement of local communities. The state must learn from history that interventions that are insensitive to the cultural, religious, and psychosocial context of families will only give rise to passive resistance, policy sabotage, and even a shift towards more hidden and undetectable forms of radicalism.

Another aspect that is no less important is the issue of children's and women's rights in the family when the state intervenes. In many cases, the state cites child protection as the main reason for entering the private sphere of the family, especially if there are indications of radical indoctrination, violence, or human rights violations. However, in reality, the implementation of interventions often overlooks the dimensions of psychological recovery, trauma healing, and the empowerment of women as agents of peace. The state usually ignores the fact that women and children in radical families are double victims—caught between family loyalty, social pressure, and fear of stigmatisation by the state. When the state serves only as a law enforcer, not as a facilitator of change, families will choose to remain in their own enclaves, rejecting external intervention and ultimately rendering the deradicalisation process futile.

In the context of public policy, the dilemma of state intervention in families also concerns the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of deradicalisation programmes themselves. Many programmes fail because they treat families merely as objects of policy, rather than as subjects with agency, choices, and the capacity to adapt (Castro & Sen, 2022). The state too often prioritises standard operating procedures, leaving little room for innovation, improvisation, or trust-based dialogue. In situations like this, families, who should be partners with the state, instead feel they are being treated as targets, objects, or even enemies to be controlled. The state must recognise that family life is far more complex than mere data variables, risk graphs, or administrative reporting outputs. Family life is a network of meaning, love, conflict, trauma, hope, and change that cannot be intervened in with a linear approach or unilateral instructions.

It cannot be denied that there are several cases where state intervention in families has indeed yielded positive results, for example, when the state can provide access to alternative education, psychosocial counselling, economic assistance, or social reintegration facilities for the families of former terrorists (Karimullah & Sugitanata, 2023). In certain areas, community-based approaches, collaboration with religious leaders, or the involvement of women's organisations have succeeded in overcoming internal family resistance and creating a space for healthy dialogue (Adiprabowo et al., 2025). However, this success generally occurs not

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

because of the power of state directives, but because the state can act as a facilitator, partner, and good listener. The key lies in the state's willingness to respect diversity, listen to aspirations, and build long-term trust with local communities.

A fundamental problem that is often overlooked by the state is that there is no single intervention model that suits all families. Cultural, religious, and social class diversity, as well as historical experiences, mean that each family has different needs, fears, and expectations (Shea et al., 2022; Taylan & Weber, 2023). The state needs to conduct in-depth social mapping before deciding on the form and level of intervention. In many cases, families considered vulnerable to radicalism actually need a safe space to talk, access to moderate information, and empathetic psychological support, rather than simply administrative labelling or digital surveillance. The state must be able to distinguish between families that do need intensive intervention and those that can be supported through a soft approach, based on trust and collaboration with the community.

The dilemma of state intervention is also inseparable from political challenges at both the national and local levels. Deradicalisation programmes are often used as political commodities to demonstrate the state's commitment to national security, even as a bargaining tool with external parties or international donors (Onapajo & Ozden, 2023). In practice, there is a strong temptation to inflate the success rate of interventions through inaccurate reporting, project-based programmes, or the labelling of vulnerable groups to meet institutional targets. In fact, true deradicalisation is a long process that requires patience, consistency, and the courage of the state to acknowledge its own failures and limitations. A state that is honest with its people, willing to learn from the community, and prioritises a humanistic approach is far more likely to succeed in building a sustainable deradicalisation ecosystem.

Ethical and human rights aspects are the most difficult tests for the state in developing family-based deradicalisation programmes. Every policy that allows for surveillance, reporting, or even direct intervention in households must be tested against the principles of proportionality, transparency, and accountability (Sanchez & Lamchek, 2023). The state must ensure that interventions are only carried out at the necessary level, with clear procedures and respect for the dignity and rights of each family member. In a democratic country such as Indonesia, the right to family privacy is an integral part of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens. The state must not use the issue of radicalism as an excuse to build a surveillance state that undermines the foundation of trust between the state and its people.

The state often fails to distinguish between dialogue-based prevention efforts and repressive strategies that actually trigger passive resistance. Many families end up choosing to hide problems, reduce openness, and close access to external information. As a result, early detection, prevention, and rehabilitation efforts are slow or fail altogether. The state must develop human rights-based evaluation instruments, involve interdisciplinary experts, and open up space for continuous criticism and improvement in every intervention policy. In many cases, the state can learn from good practices emerging in local communities and civil society organisations.

A participatory approach, including facilitating discussion spaces, digital literacy training, and strengthening the role of women and children as agents of peace, has proven more effective and acceptable to families than coercive intervention strategies. The state needs to shift its paradigm from being a guardian of security to a facilitator of social change, from a surveillance approach to an empowerment approach. In an increasingly complex world, the state cannot control everything. Still, it can create an ecosystem conducive to the growth of resilient families that are critical and open to diversity.

The dilemma of state intervention in the private sphere of the family reflects the eternal struggle between the logic of security and freedom, between collective needs and individual rights, between the state as protector and the state as controller (Hibbatulloh et al., 2025; Latif et al., 2025; Prianto et al., 2024). There is no simple answer to this problem. What is needed is

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

the courage of all parties to continue dialogue, build trust, and recognise the limits of state power amid the complexity of Indonesian society. The state must ensure that every intervention is accompanied by critical reflection, policy correction, and respect for human dignity. If not, deradicalisation programmes will not only fail to guarantee national security but also risk creating new trauma, alienation, and a cycle of radicalism that is increasingly difficult to break. Indonesian families must remain a safe space for their members to grow, engage in dialogue, and find meaning in life together, rather than simply being objects of state surveillance that have lost their autonomy and privacy rights.

D. Conclusion

The family plays a highly strategic yet vulnerable role in efforts to prevent radicalism. The family is not only the first filter but also an arena for the tug-of-war between values, traditions, and ideologies, which often becomes a stage for latent generational conflict and a source of a crisis of authority. The effectiveness of the family as a bastion of deradicalisation is primarily determined by the quality of internal dialogue, openness to change, the ability to build digital literacy, and the courage to acknowledge and manage differences within the home. However, families cannot work alone in facing the increasingly sophisticated wave of radical ideological infiltration; support from the state, community, and educational institutions is crucial as an empowering ecosystem so that families do not become victims of isolation, stigmatisation, or criminalisation.

At the same time, any state intervention must be carried out sensitively and participatively, without neglecting the family's autonomy as a private space rich in values and beliefs. The key to the success of this strategy is not surveillance and control, but empowerment, facilitation of dialogue, and strengthening of inclusive social networks. Deradicalisation will not succeed without a paradigm shift from a coercive approach to a humanistic, locally grounded collaboration. Only through constructive synergy among families, the state, and civil society will Indonesia's deradicalisation strategy address the global challenge of radicalism while preserving the integrity, freedom, and humanity of each family member as the primary foundation of national resilience.

E. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to record their sincere appreciation to all those who contributed to the successful completion of this study. We are especially grateful to our supervisors and colleagues for their guidance, thoughtful discussion, and rigorous critique, which strengthened the conceptual framing and methodological approach of the work, and we extend our thanks to the reviewers for their careful reading and constructive suggestions that improved the clarity and coherence of the manuscript.

References

Adiprabowo, V. D., Mulyana, D., Karlinah, S., & Rachmawati, T. S. (2025). Strategic Communication in Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Advocacy: A Case Study of a Local Organisation in Indonesia. *Social Sciences*, *14*(11), 633. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14110633

Ahdash, F. (2024). The familialization of terrorism and the securitization of the family: gendered narratives of infantilization and demonization. *Journal of Law and Society*, *51*(2), 212–238. https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12478

Al Hamid, R., Jamil, M. S., Nimah, R., & Siregar, M. A. H. (2025). Political Conflict between Islamic Law and National Law in Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.4

Alakoc, B. P., Werner, S., & Widmeier, M. (2023). Violent and nonviolent strategies of terrorist organizations: how do mixed strategies influence terrorist recruitment and lethality?

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, *46*(12), 2598–2621. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1935706

Arifin, S. (2016). Islamic religious education and radicalism in Indonesia: Strategy of de-radicalization through strengthening the living values education. *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, *6*(1), 93–126. https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v6i1.93-126

Ayu, R. F., Albab, M. U., Yakin, M. A., & Hibbatulloh, I. (2025). Legal Challenges in Countering Religion-Based Terrorism in Asia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, *1*(1), 1–15.

Barton, G., & Vergani, M. (2021). Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and Rehabilitation. In *Countering violent and hateful extremism in Indonesia: Islam, gender and civil society* (pp. 63–82). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_3

Castro, B., & Sen, R. (2022). Everyday adaptation: theorizing climate change adaptation in daily life. *Global Environmental Change*, *75*, 102555. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102555

Cooke, H. A., Wu, S. A., Bourbonnais, A., & Baumbusch, J. (2023). Disruptions in relational continuity: The impact of pandemic public health measures on families in long-term care. *Journal of Family Nursing*, *29*(1), 6–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/10748407221102462

Crain, W. (2015). Bandura's social learning theory. In *Theories of development: Concepts and applications* (pp. 218–237). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315662473-15

Cross, M. K. D. (2023). Counter-terrorism & the intelligence network in Europe. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, *72*, 100368. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.100368

Dasopang, M. D., Nasution, I. F. A., & Lubis, A. H. (2023). The role of religious and cultural education as a resolution of radicalism conflict in Sibolga community. *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies*, *79*(1), 8469. https://doi.org/10520/ejc-hervorm_v79_n1_a8469

Fathony, M. R., Khiyaroh, L., Karimullah, S. S., & Kustiawan, M. T. (2024). Resistance to Gender Equality: Criticism of Physical Violence from the PKDRT Law Perspective. *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Law*, *7*(1), 105–124. https://doi.org/10.35719/1xjdkk59

Glazzard, A. (2025). Violent extremist disengagement and reintegration: A framework for planning, design and evaluation of programmatic interventions. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *48*(4), 419–438. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2098553

Hayatullah, M., Ikhsan, M., Ramadhany, S. S. M., Rohman, I. N., & Hidayat, T. (2025). Media Discourse Analysis on Religious Tolerance Issues in Indonesia. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, *1*(1), 61–75. https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.8

Hayatullah, M., Rohman, M. A., & Gonzales, N. (2025). Analysis of Shiite Political Thought in Iran and Its Influence in Indonesia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, *1*(1), 16–31.

Hibbatulloh, I., Najhan, A. S., Dzulfikar, M. L., & Mabrur, R. (2025). The Secularisation of Islamic Criminal Law and Its Implications for the Protection of Human Rights in Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 17–31. https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.7

Hidayat, R. E., Hakim, A., Karimullah, S. S., & Rohmah, U. A. (2024). Integrating Islamic Humanitarianism and Modern Ulama Perspectives: Child Protection in Indonesia's Policy Framework. *Khazanah: Jurnal Studi Islam Dan Humaniora*, *22*(1), 143–166. https://doi.org/10.18592/khazanah.v22i1.12688

Ilyas, M., & Athwal, R. (2021). De-radicalisation and humanitarianism in Indonesia. *Social Sciences*, *10*(3), 87. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10030087

Jean-Berluche, D. (2024). Faith and parenting: Investigating the intersection of religious beliefs, child welfare, and intervention strategies. *Journal of Family Trauma, Child Custody & Child Development*, *21*(2), 237–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/26904586.2023.2280197

Karimullah, S. S. (2022). Moral Values Internalization of Pancasila in the Education System: A Response to the Problems of Radicalism. *Technical and Vocational Education International Journal (TAVEIJ)*, *2*(01), 32–38.

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

Karimullah, S. S. (2023). Empowering Youth: Social Transformation and Islamic Law's Impact on Child Rights. *VARIA HUKUM*, *5*(2), 153–169. https://doi.org/10.15575/vh.v5i2.28209

Karimullah, S. S., Efendi, B., Sattar, S., & Ningsih, T. W. (2023). The Role of the Family in Instilling Islamic-based Business Ethics in Children. *HAKAM: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam Dan Hukum Ekonomi Islam*, *7*(2), 270–287. https://doi.org/10.33650/jhi.v7i2.6972

Karimullah, S. S., Ghani, A., Nuruzzahri, N., & Diana, D. (2025). The Influence of Religious Education in Muslim Families on Understanding Peace and Tolerance. *Belajea: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, *10*(1), 67–86. https://doi.org/10.29240/belajea.v10i1.10949

Karimullah, S. S., Nugraha, A. R., Nisa, I. S., & Andini, Y. (2023). The relevance of feminism in promoting gender reform in the context of progressive Islam. *Jurnal Anifa: Studi Gender Dan Anak*, *4*(2), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.32505/anifa.v4i2.7187

Karimullah, S. S., & Sugitanata, A. (2023). The Government's Strategies for Promoting Religious Tolerance in a Multicultural Society. *Journal of Religious Policy*, *2*(1), 75–102.

Karimullah, S. S., & Sugitanata, A. (2024). Urgensi Pemahaman Gender Pada Anak dalam Membangun Kepribadian yang Berkualitas. *NOURA: Jurnal Kajian Gender Dan Anak*, *8*(1), 54–70. https://doi.org/10.32923/nou.v8i1.3340

Koehler, D., & Ehrt, T. (2018). Parents' associations, support group interventions and countering violent extremism: An important step forward in combating violent radicalization. *International Annals of Criminology*, *56*(1–2), 178–197. https://doi.org/10.1017/cri.2018.8

Kurniawan, M. R., Fathony, M. R., Yasin, D. T., Jibu, S. A., & Shamat, A. (2025). Political Analysis of Islamic Law on the Regulation of Interfaith Marriage in Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 32–47. https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.2

Kusumaningrum, S., Siagian, C., & Beazley, H. (2022). Children during the COVID-19 pandemic: children and young people's vulnerability and wellbeing in Indonesia. *Children's Geographies*, *20*(4), 437–447. https://doi.org/10.1080/14733285.2021.1900544

Latif, F. A., Dahhur, M., & Ramadhany, S. S. M. (2025). Protection of Freedom of Religion in Islamic Law in Secular Turkey and Its Relevance for Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.1

Malik, I., Karimullah, S. S., Okur, H., & Rahman, R. (2025). Gender Analysis in the Islamic Law-Based Ecofeminism Movement for Ecosystem Protection. *El-Mashlahah*, *15*(1), 101–124. https://doi.org/10.23971/el-mashlahah.v15i1.9040

Marone, F. (2023). Dilemmas of the terrorist underworld: the management of internal secrecy in terrorist organisations. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, *15*(3), 336–360. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2021.1947867

Masten, A. S. (2018). Resilience theory and research on children and families: Past, present, and promise. *Journal of Family Theory & Review*, *10*(1), 12–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12255

Mubaraq, Z., Arifin, S., Abdullah, I., Jubba, H., & Indiyanto, A. (2022). Return of the Lost Son: Disengagement and social reintegration of former terrorists in Indonesia. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *8*(1), 2135235. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2022.2135235

Muhammad, A., & Hiariej, E. (2021). Deradicalization program in Indonesia radicalizing the radicals. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *7*(1), 1905219. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1905219

Muttaqin, M. A., Rifa'i, S. D., Yahya, H., & Sakinah, H. (2025). The Dynamics of the Relationship between Islamic Law and Customary Law in Inheritance Disputes in Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 80–95. https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.6

Nugroho, A., Amir, H., Maududy, I., & Marlina, I. (2021). Poverty eradication programs in Indonesia: Progress, challenges and reforms. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, *43*(6), 1204–1224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2021.05.002

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

Núñez-Gómez, P., Larrañaga, K. P., Rangel, C., & Ortega-Mohedano, F. (2021). Critical analysis of the risks in the use of the internet and social networks in childhood and adolescence. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *12*, 683384. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.683384

Nurhayati, N., & Hamid, A. (2020). Radicalism prevention through islamic religious education learning at elementary school. *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, *6*(1), 109–126. https://doi.org/10.15575/jpi.v6i1.8352

Nuriskandar, L. H., Muhammad, A. A., Alam, S., & Khiyaroh, L. (2025). The Convergence of Islamic Law and Customary Law in the Management of Zakat in Indonesia and Malaysia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 63–79. https://journal.mahkotascience.org/index.php/insani/article/view/5

Nurizka, M. S., Islami, A., Rofi'ieh, M., & Dzulfikar, M. L. (2025). Criticism of the Neoclassical Approach in Islamic Economic Policy in Indonesia. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, *1*(1), 17–30. https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.9

Nurizka, M. S., Jamil, M. S., & Sholeh, B. (2025). Analysis of the Impact of Sharia Regulations on Halal Trade in Southeast Asia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, *1*(1), 32–47.

Ogunnubi, O., & Aja, U. A. (2024). The de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration project in Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy: Operation Safe Corridor in context. *African Identities*, *22*(3), 811–827. https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2022.2125365

Onapajo, H., & Ozden, K. (2023). Non-military approach against terrorism in Nigeria: deradicalization strategies and challenges in countering Boko Haram. In *Ten years of Boko Haram in Nigeria: The dynamics and counterinsurgency challenges* (pp. 145–161). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22769-1_8

Parhi, N. Z., Hudafi, H., Pangestu, R., & Elmurtadho, F. (2025). Tension between Islamic Law and Human Rights in Child Marriage Cases in Indonesia. *Insani: Jurnal Pranata Sosial Hukum Islam*, *1*(1), 96–110. https://doi.org/10.65586/insani.v1i1.3

Pemberton, A. (2010). Needs of victims of terrorism. In *Assisting victims of terrorism: Towards a European standard of justice* (pp. 73–141). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3025-2_3

Prianto, A. L., Karimullah, S. S., Idri, I., Ibrahim, Z. S., Nugraha, A. R., & Gönan, Y. (2024). Hijacking of State Power on Religious Freedom by Community Organizations in Indonesia. *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura*, *24*(2), 348–367. https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v24i2.17916

Ravalier, J., Jones, D., Truell, R., & McFadden, P. (2022). Global social work working conditions and wellbeing. *International Social Work*, *65*(6), 1078–1094. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208728221112731

Rembulan, C., Maghfur, I. R., Siregar, M. A. H., Jakfar, M. A., & Solehah, S. (2025). The Impact of the Digital Economy on Economic Empowerment Models for Muslim Youth in Indonesia. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, *1*(1), 48–63.

Riandi, M. R., Safitri, A., & Munawaroh, K. (2025). Indonesian Diaspora Halal Cuisine as Cultural Diplomacy. *Jurnal Lentera Insani*, *1*(1), 64–79.

Riany, Y. E., Haslam, D., Musyafak, N., Farida, J., Ma'arif, S., & Sanders, M. (2019). Understanding the role of parenting in developing radical beliefs: Lessons learned from Indonesia. *Security Journal*, *32*(3), 236–263. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-018-00162-6

Rifa'i, S. D., Siregar, M. A. H., Utami, I. P., Mujahid, A., & Fakhis, A. Z. P. (2025). Deconstructing Colonial Law Through Critical Race Theory in Indonesian Regulations. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, *1*(1), 46–60. https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.12

Sanchez, E. M., & Lamchek, J. S. (2023). Creating a sovereign wealth fund in a corruption-riddled country: Energizing transparency and sound governance with direct benefit-sharing. *Resources Policy*, *81*, 103244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.103244

Santhana Dass, R. A. (2021). The use of family networks in suicide terrorism: a case study of

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21

the 2018 Surabaya attacks. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, *16*(2), 173–191. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1906932

Scremin, N. (2023). Family matters: A preliminary framework for understanding family influence on islamist radicalization. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *46*(8), 1491–1507. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1841242

Shea, L., Pesa, J., Geonnotti, G., Powell, V., Kahn, C., & Peters, W. (2022). Improving diversity in study participation: patient perspectives on barriers, racial differences and the role of communities. *Health Expectations*, *25*(4), 1979–1987. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13554

Sporer, K., & Buxton, B. (2024). The role of family members in the prevention of violent extremism and terrorism: A scoping review of the literature. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, *78*, 101990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2024.101990

Taylan, C., & Weber, L. T. (2023). "Don't let me be misunderstood": communication with patients from a different cultural background. *Pediatric Nephrology*, *38*(3), 643–649. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00467-022-05573-7

Wahyudi, Mahrus, Kurniyadi, Munawwarah, U. D., & Khoiruddin. (2025). Carl Rogers' Humanistic Approach in Character Education in Pesantren. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, *1*(1), 31–45. https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.10

Walsh, F. (2016). Family resilience: A developmental systems framework. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *13*(3), 313–324. https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2016.1154035

Wati, T. P., Naimah, N., Karimullah, S. S., & Anggita, I. S. (2022). Consistency of Balinese Family Education in Forming a Love of Culture From an Early Childhood. *Devotion Journal of Community Service*, *3*(11), 1–126. https://doi.org/10.36418/dev.v3i11.221

Wibowo, D., & Ahmed, Z. S. (2024). Peace education for deradicalization. In *The Routledge Handbook of Conflict and Peace Communication* (pp. 272–279). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003392002-32

Wildan, M. (2021). Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: The role of former terrorists and civil society organisations. In *Countering violent and hateful extremism in Indonesia: Islam, gender and civil society* (pp. 195–214). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_9

Wiranti, B., Latif, F. A., Hibbatulloh, I., Sakinah, H., & Hidayatullah, M. W. (2025). Political Feminism and Women's Representation in Public Policy in Indonesia. *Jurnal Pelita Raya*, *1*(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.65586/jpr.v1i1.11

Yazid, A., Karimullah, S. S., & Sugitanata, A. (2023). Comparative Study On Childfree Marriage In Some Selected Countries. *Jurnal Al-Hakim: Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa, Studi Syariah, Hukum Dan Filantropi*, *5*(2), 267–284. https://doi.org/10.22515/jurnalalhakim.v5i2.7869

Zheng, N., Li, C., Ye, S., Xue, D., & Zhang, J. (2025). The dilemmas of maternal practices and care strategies for middle-aged and older women under China's delayed retirement policy. *Journal of Women & Aging*, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/08952841.2025.2597184

Zych, I., & Nasaescu, E. (2022). Is radicalization a family issue? A systematic review of family-related risk and protective factors, consequences, and interventions against radicalization. *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, *18*(3), e1266. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1266

 DOI: 10.65586/jpr.v1i2.21